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MOBILE EQUIPMENT FINANCING: FEDERAL PERFECTION
OF CARRIER LIENS
IN addition to the countervailing themes and interests underlying all secured
commercial transactions, unique considerations should fashion regulation of
mobile equipment financing. Secured credit arrangements reflect a triad of
conflicting demands. Borrowers need ready sources of constant working capi-
tal.1 Institutional lenders require security that will not only withstand attack
but be so obviously valid as not to invite it.2 Unsecured creditors, to preserve
recourse against unencumbered assets, must decry secret liens and preferential
or fraudulent transfers. 3 The body of law which aligns these interests has at-
tained tortuous development from initial legislative and judicial hostility to-
ward security transfers despite revolutionary changes in commercial practice. 4
Basic to all regulation is a fear of the lender's bargaining position. Legislatures
have prescribed formalities designed to impress borrowers with the seriousness
of a security transaction and to warn unsecured creditors of its existence.5 As
well as strictly enforcing these prerequisities, courts have evolved further
doctrines which imprecisely counter collusive arrangements while needlessly
thwarting bona fide transactions.6 On the other hand, facilitation of credit is
1. See HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 369-74 (1954).
2. Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 430 n.99 (1958). See also Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel
Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 530 (1948) ; Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security,
37 HARv. L. REv. 201, 207-09, 212 (1923). If bankruptcy intervenes, a creditor secured by
a large proportion of the business assets is in a better position to persuade the trustee to
continue operations, thereby generating debt retirement funds. FREDERICK, COM1MERCIAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION 456 (rev. ed. 1947).
3. Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IowA L.
REv. 528, 544 (1942).
4. Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952 Wis.
L. REV. 348, 349-50; Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 2, at 533. The statutes still contain
many vestiges of the prejudice marking an era of small personal property security trans-
actions despite the present multibillion dollar annual volume of secured commercial financ-
ing. Ireton, Article 9 of the Uniform Comnercidl Code-Part III, 6 PERS. F.L.Q. REP.
64 (1950).
5. Witnessing, acknowledgment, notarization, good faith affidavits, value statements,
verification and attestation are among the more important prerequisites imposed. See
notes 149-52 infra and accompanying text.
6. For example, one court has repeatedly held that failure to record absolutely voids
a lien although the lender repossessed the chattels before intervening interests had at-
tached. Cardenas v. Miller, 108 Cal. 250, 39 Pac. 783 (1895); Chelhar v. Acme Garage,
18 Cal. App. 2d 775, 61 P.2d 1232 (1936). Another has allowed an attachment to prevail
over an unrecorded mortgage when the security was merely in transit through the state.
Pennington County Bank v. Bauman, 81 Neb. 782, 116 N.W. 669 (1908). Still others have
evolved an immediate recordation rule invalidating liens when execution and recordation
are not virtually simultaneous. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F.2d 449 (Sth Cir.
1953) (five days unreasonable delay; two hours adequate for recording) ; Cass v. Roth-
man, 42 Ohio St. 380 (1884) (eight hours too long a delay). Recordation errors through
MOBILE EQUIPMENT FINANCING
rarely considered as compelling a policy determinant. Yet businesses without
credit positions warranting unsecured financing would be the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the low interest money supply which unimpeachable security de-
vices permit. Influenced by varying social and economic pressures within each
jurisdiction, the balancing of these interests and themes has evoked divergent
state laws.7 Conforming local transactions to the standards of one jurisdiction,
though, is not an unduly burdensome process. And with uniformly accepted
conflict of laws rules, commercial practicability could be attained in most
multistate arrangements. 8
In the mobile equipment field, however, prevailing conflicts doctrine com-
bines with disparate state laws to make safe financing dependent on the uni-
form treatment enabled by federal legislation. Lex situs-the law of the place
where the thing is located-is usually chosen to govern chattel transfer de-
cisions." While providing uniformity and predictability for arrangements in-
volving immovables, lex situs has proven a formidable obstacle to ship, rail,
air and motor truck financing. 10 Since transportation equipment constantly
changes location, creditors require liens perfected in every jurisdiction in
which their collateral is likely to operate." But lien protection has been prob-
'ault of the filing clerk have also caused lien forfeiture. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell,
53 Neb. 298, 44 N.W.2d 501 (1950) ; Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit
"inance Corp., 164 Va. 579, 180 S.E. 408 (1-935). In bankruptcy cases, one court has
cvolved a "part-bad, all-bad" rule designed to invalidate in toto liens which are only
artially defective. Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926); Arbury v. Kocher, 18
.2d 588 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). Sometimes, the slightest word variation in a filed document
ill cause avoidance. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109
E.2d 143 (1952) (trust receipt financing statement filed under name of "E. R. Millen
o." avoided because word "Inc." omitted). One commentator even discusses cases in which
torts, confronted with statutes requiring an affidavit to be "affixed," have debated whether
wire staple was sufficient or whether mucilage was essential. Birnbaum, supra note 4,
it 350.
7. Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 49-51 (1951).
8. See Comment, 67 YALEI L.J. 402 (1.958).
9. See, e.g., Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866) ; Steckel v. Swift
& Co., 56 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N.Y. 175, 158
N.E. 64 (1927). See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Northwest Engineer-
ing Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927). The rule is the same in England. Cammel v.
Sewell, 15 H. & N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (Ex. 1860) ; Hellendall, The Res in Transitu
and Similar Problems in the Conflict of Laws, 17 CAN. B. REv. 7 (1939). For general
discussion, see GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 474-78 (3d ed. 1949) ; LALIvE, THE TRANS-
FER OF CHATTELS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 34-43 (1955) ; STUMBFRG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
390-402 (2d ed. 1951).
10. Many motor trucks include two separate units, tractor and trailer. No distinction
is made between the two in this Comment. Also, since the bus transportation industry
faces problems substantially identical to those confronting the trucking industry, S. REP.
No. 701, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957), motor busses and trucks are treated concurrently.
11. DAVIS, THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY-SOME FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ASPECTS 12
(1954); Odle, Financing the Trucking Industry, Burroughs Clearing House, Jan. 1953,
pp. 34, 78. Cf. Great Am. Indemnity Co. v. Utility Contractors, Inc., 21 Tenn. App. 463,
111 S.W.2d 901 (1.937).
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lematical when attempted.12 In response to the resulting creditor reluctance
to finance, Congress has intervened to regulate security interests in aircraft,
railroad and maritime equipment.' 3 The touchstone of this legislation-filing
with federal agencies-eliminates multistate perfection difficulties. Neverthe-
less, the influence of outmoded doctrines pervades the overformalized recor-
dation procedures provided. More important, federal legislation has taken an
industry-by-industry approach, ignoring carrier lien perfection similarities and
the possible advantages of consolidated statutory coverage.' 4 Recent efforts to
secure still another separate federal filing statute for liens on interstate motor
carriers suggest reappraisal of the existing regulatory pattern to determine
whether continued segregation is desirable as well as to avoid extension of
present shortcomings.
SHIPS
Unique characteristics of admiralty law have shaped the development of
secured maritime financing. The first device utilizing ships as security for
maritime credit transactions was the hypothecated bottomry-admiralty's
equivalent of the chattel mortgage. 15 While bottomry bonds owed their en-
forceability to admiralty courts, their defects stemmed from an unusual restric-
tion imposed by those tribunals.' 6 Loss at sea not only deprived lenders of
their security but discharged their claims against the borrower's other assets. 17
Obviously impractical during the more precarious era of the clipper ship, bot-
tomry bonds were largely replaced during the nineteenth century by ordinary
12. The situation has so deteriorated that the trucking industry finds "it is almost
impossible to take steps necessary to assure the validity of a lien." S. RFe. No. 553, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). See also Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Surface Trans-
portation of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 375, S. 938,
S. 940, S. 1385, S. 1721, S. 2031, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1957).
13. The Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 1000, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 91.1-84
(1952) ; Civil Aeronautics Act § 503, 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523
(1952) ; Interstate Commerce Act § 20c, 66 STAT. 724, 49 U.S.C. § 20c (1952).
14. All federal legislation regulating transportation services is divided by industry
because of differing physical operations. This approach has unfortunately been carried
over to lien perfection statutes although the same reasons for segregated treatment do
not exist. See, e.g., HoNNoLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 442-43 (noting the similarity of
legislation covering rail, air and ship lien perfection, suggesting the necessity for similarly
covering trucks and busses, but ignoring the obvious possibility of a combined statute).
15. Hebert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, 4 TUL. L. REv. 381, 395-96
(1930). Another early device was the respondentia loan-a lien on the vessel's cargo
equivalent to the hypothecated bottomry of the ship. For examples of both security devices,
see 1 BENEDiCr, AMEMRCAN ANmIRALTY 316, 320 (6th ed. 1940).
16. Bottomry bonds were subject to admiralty jurisdiction even if they partly secured
nonmaritime property. The Draco, 7 Fed. Cas. 1032, No. 4057 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835); see
The Katherine, 15 F.2d 387 (E.D. La. 1926).
17. The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 135 (1870); Carrington v. The Brig Ann
C. Pratt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 63, 67 (1856). See also Canfield, The Ship Mortgage Act
of 1920, 22 MicH. L. REv. 10 (1923).
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chattel mortgages.' But, again, peculiarities of admiralty law frustrated credit
arrangements. Under the ship personification doctrine, vessels are legally re-
sponsible for their debts.19 Obligations incurred by this fictional entity, such
as those for supplies, repairs, towage and wharfarge, automatically created
maritime liens which had to be discharged before the vessel could be applied
to the owner's personal-nonmaritime--indebtedness.2 0 Their claims denied
maritime status by an early Supreme Court decision, 21 ship mortgagees were
left with alternative "remedies": they could foreclose in equity subject to all
maritime encumbrances 22 or intervene in admiralty proceedings to enforce
their rights against whatever surplus remained after satisfaction of maritime
liens.23
In 1920, Congress sought to resolve this dilemma by extending admiralty
jurisdiction to ship mortgages. Spurred by the peacetime necessity to dispose
of more than 1100 ships acquired by the government during World War 1,24
18. GILxoRE & BLAcx, ADMIRALTY 570 (1957) (hereinafter cited as GILMrORE &
BLACx).
19. The personification theory has one of the most colorful historical backgrounds of
any American legal doctrine. It was created by Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on cir-
cuit, in the piracy case of United States v. The Little Charles, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15612, at
982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) ("[T]his is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceed-
ing against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel .... It is true, that in-
animate matter can commit no offence. The mere wood, iron and sails of the ship, cannot,
of themselves, violate the law. But this body is animated and put in action by the crew,
who are guided by the master . . . ."). Then, in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1
(1827), Mr. Justice Story, following the pattern, found another vessel guilty of piracy,
and therefore forfeitable to the United States. The climax came in the comic opera case
of United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). Mr. Justice
Story was again confronted with a libel in rem against a ship, this time for the Pirates-
of-Penzance type acts of her captain. Unlike Pahnyra, where the owners had authorized
the piratical depredations, the Malek Adhel's master had gone off on a frolic of his own.
Nonetheless, the ship was held liable as a separate entity for piratical offenses committed
against the United States, and thus forfeiture was ordered.
20. See Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 9
(1920) ; ROBINSON, ADMIRAL.TY 363-64 (1939). For historical discussion, see UNDERHAY,
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH THEORIES OF THE MARITIME LIEN c. 1 (unpublished thesis in
Yale Law School Library 1937). See also PRICE, MARITIME LIENS c. 1. (1940) ; Hebert,
supra note 15. Typical maritime liens arise from seamen's wages, salvage, tort damages,
general average ("partial loss which is incurred when some of the values at risk in the
marine venture are sacrificed to save the remainder from peril . . . ." GILMORE & BLAMC
73), supplies, repairs, towage, wharfage, pilotage, stevedoring, cargo damages, unpaid
freight, charter parties (vessel leases) and bottomry bonds. Id. at 514-18.
21. Bogart v. The Steamboat John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854). Indeed, so
sacrosanct was the maritime-nonmaritime dichotomy that in The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S.
1 (1892), a state created maritime lien was given precedence over a previously filed ship
encumbrance recorded under the federal Vessel Sales and Mortgage Recording Act of
July 29, 1850, c. 27, § 1, REv. STAT. § 4192 (1875).
22. GILMORE & BLAcx 569.
23. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21. Wall.) 558 (1874) ; The Hendrik Hudson, 11 Fed.
Cas. 1037, No. 6358 (N.D.N.Y. 1855).
24. Prior to American entry in World War I, the United States merchant fleet had
practically vanished. The entire blame, however, cannot be ascribed to the inutility of
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it passed the Ship Mortgage Act.2 5 Because an effective security interest was
imperative to interest private capital in financing the sales, 26 ship mortgages
were given priority over most subsequent maritime liens.2 7 But strict formal-
ities imposed by the statute contributed to the discouragement of private
lenders, and sales had to be governmentally financed. 28 Indeed, as far as pri-
vate capital was concerned, the act was virtually dormant until 1940.29 Only
the increased demand for marine transportation initiated by Xrorld War II
and continuing to date has enabled the industry to obtain institutional credit.30
The security device usually employed is a combination chattel mortgage and
existing security devices. American shipping was suffering from technological stasis. By
clinging to the clipper ship long after that colorful vessel had outlived its commercial
utility, the industry could not attract private capital. Had a valid security device been
badly needed, most likely one would have been created. GuI eoRE & BLACK 570.
25. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1952). Ship mortgages
had been removed from the domain of state recordation laws by the Vessel Sales and
Mortgage Recording Act of July 29, 1850, c. 27, § 1, REv. STAT. § 4192 (1875). See
White's Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 646 (1868). But that act provided only for
the recordation, not status. of mortgage liens. With the enactment of the Ship Mortgage
Act, the 1850 statute was therefore repealed. Act of June 5, 1920, c. 250, § 30(X), 41 STAT.
1006 (1920).
26. The Favorite, 120 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1941) ; ROBINSON, AD.IIRALTY 442 (1939).
27. Four maritime liens-seamen's wages, salvage, tort damages and general average
-were still preferred over a prior mortgage. 41 STAT. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953
(1952). See note 20 supra. See also The Eastern Shore, 31 F. Supp. 964 (D. Md. 1940).
Government tax liens, however, are generally subordinate to a preferred ship mortgage.
-United States v. Flood, 247 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1957) ; Gulf Coast Marine Ways v. The
J. R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 384-85 (S.D. Tex. 1952). For complete discussion of
lien-mortgage priorities, see GiLIORE & BLACK 610-16.
28. See notes 34-43 infra and accompanying text. In addition, Congress limited the
types of mortgages which could acquire preferred standing. Certain vessels are ineligible.
41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1952). Moreover, the mortgagee has to be a
United States citizen. Id. at § 922(a) (5). Originally, only mortgages on ships registered
as vessels of the United States were eligible, but certain foreign ship mortgages were
admitted by a 1954 amendment. 68 STAT. 323 (1954), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (Supp. V, 1958).
This extension of the act primarily benefited American shipping since many United States
firms have been registering under foreign flags to escape our extremely stringent shipping
regulations. Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587 (1953). However, unlike American
mortgages, foreign encumbrances are subordinated to certain maritime liens arising from
work performed or supplies furnished in the United States. For a review of the legislative
history of the 1954 amendment, see Rederiaktierbolaget v. Compania De Navegacion Anne,
139 F. Supp. 327, 334-35 (D.C.Z. 1955). See, generally, Lord & Glenn, The Foreign Ship
Mortgage, 56 YALE L.J. 923 (1947).
29. The widespread failure to take advantage of the act can also be explained in terms
of constitutional uncertainty. GILMORE & BLAcK 571; see Canfield, supra note 17, at 24;
Comment, The Constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act, 33 YALE L.J. 646 (1924).
Lower federal courts were unanimous in sustaining the act. See, e.g., The Lincoln Land,
295 Fed. 358, 360-61 (D. Mass. 1923); The Nanking, 292 Fed. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1923);
The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927, 930-33 (E.D. Va. 1.921). Not until 1934, however, did the
Supreme Court finally settle the question, Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293
U.S. 21, 42-52 (1934), and by then the depression had curbed commercial financing.
30. See Business Week, April 26, 1958, pp. 120-33.
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contractual assignment.31 Widespread separation of vessel ownership and oper-
ation underlies this distinctive financial practice. The owner charters-leases
-the vessel and assigns the charter party-lease-to the mortgagee. 32 Actu-
ally, the primary security is the hire-rent-to be paid by the charterer, the
mortgage considered as secondary insurance foreclosable only on default of
both charterer and owner.33 Nevertheless, mortgage perfection is necessary
and, unfortunately, quite difficult under the statute's recordation provisions.
Statutory Defects
Insistence on formalities and a detailed recording scheme combine to bur-
den creditors attempting to perfect security interests under the act.3 4 First,
the ship must have a "home port" for recordation, selected by its owner and
approved by the Maritime Administration.35 Failure to secure approval, or
filing in the wrong port, invalidates the instrument.30 Upon recordation, the
31. Simpson, Ship Financing-A Panel Discussion, 13 Bus. LAW. 145, 148, 166, 175
(1958). The combination mortgage and assignment are often tied to the trust indenture
of a bond issue. Id. at 169-70. Conditional sales contracts, though still subject to state
recordation laws, Stewart & Co. v. Rivara, 274 U.S. 614 (1927), are also occasionally
used. Whatever the security device, secured financing remains subject to state recording
statutes while ships are under construction. Rodgers, Ship Construction Finaning, 12
Bus. LAW. 142, 147-51 (1957) ; see In re Empire Shipbuilding Co., 221 Fed. 223 (2d Cir.
1915) (pre-Mortgage Act case).
32. For discussion of charter party assignments, see Simpson, supra note 31, at 160-66.
33. Id. at 175.
34. For conditions which must be fulfilled prior to recordation, see 41 STAT. 1002
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 926 (1952).
35. 43 STAT. 947 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 18 (1952). Even mortgages on vessels which
are not entitled to priority over maritime liens, see note 28 supra, must be filed in the
ship's home port. Compare 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1952), with id. § 922.
The system was adapted from the Vessel Sales and Mortgage Recording Act of July 29,
1850, c. 27, § 1, REV. STAT. § 4192 (1875), an outmoded model for a modern commercial
statute.
36. Maritime Administration consent must be obtained before the mortgage is pre-
sented for recordation. The R. Lenahan, 10 F. Supp. 497, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1935). But cf.
The Fort Orange, 5 F. Supp. 833, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (mortgage recordation after the
Maritime Administration had orally approved the home port selection but prior to written
consent held valid). In common parlance, home port means the port from which the vessel
operates. The Mortgage Act does not use the term home port; it requires recordation
with the Collector of Customs in the vessel's port of documentation. The latter phrase
being undefined, the early practice was home port recordation. Then, in The Susana, 2
F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1924), the court held the proper port of documentation to be the one
nearest the owner's residence or, in the case of a corporation, that nearest the place of
incorporation. The effect of this holding was to cast doubt on the preferred status of some
800 mortgages previously recorded by corporations. Congress immediately passed the
Home Port of Vessels Act, subdivided into five sections. Section 1, 43 STAT. 947 (1925),
46 U.S.C. § 18 (1952), provides for owner selection of the home port subject to Maritime
Administration approval. Sections 2-5, 43 STAT. 948 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 101.1-14 (1952),
validated all previous recordations and went on to provide that the port of documentation
referred to in the Ship Mortgage Act was the home port defined in § 1.
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Collector of Customs at the home port must indorse the mortgage on the ship's
papers.3 7 Should a clerk not record filed documents, or commit other errors
in the recording procedure, risk of loss falls on the mortgagee.38 And if the
Customs Office omits the indorsement, or indorses improperly, preferred stand-
ing-priority over maritime liens-is forfeited.3 9 The burden of the indorse-
ment process is increased by the requirement that ship's papers be carried on
board at all times.40 Many vessels operate under time charters whereby owners
relinquish control for extended periods and cannot order return to an Ameri-
can port until the charter party expires.41 Since indorsement is obviously im-
possible during a ship's voyage, 42 secured financing must await its return.
43
37. 41 STAT. 1000-01 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (1), (a)(2), (d) (1952). If the
vessel is in another American port at time of filing, indorsement is to be effected there.
The home port Collector will telegraph or mail indorsement instructions to the Collector
of the port where the vessel is located at the mortgagees expense. Harbor clearance is
not to be granted until the indorsement process is completed. 41 STAT. 1001 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 922(d)(2) (1952).
38. GILmORE & BLACK 587. Theoretically, the Collector of Customs is liable for any
pecuniary loss resulting from his misfeasance. 41 STAT. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 941
(1952). Whether the Collector is personally or officially liable has never been determined.
judicial reluctance to hold the government responsible in other filing contexts probably
underlies the paucity of litigation here. See note 215 infra.
39. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. The Northern Star, 271 U.S. 552 (1926); The
Bethlehem, 4 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1925). Four separate items must be indorsed. 41 STAT.
1001 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(c) (1952).
40. See Simpson, supra note 31, at 172.
41. Id. at 151-55.
42. Conceivably, the Customs Collector might designate a ship's captain his agent for
indorsement purposes during voyage. Whether this has been tried, or would withstand
judicial scrutiny, is unknown.
43. For suggested revision, see text at note 213 infra.
Submission of a good faith affidavit in statutorily prescribed form is also required.
41 STAT. 1001 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(a) (3) (1952). Failure to include this document
invalidates an otherwise preferred mortgage. The Angler, 23 F. Supp. 341, 342 (E.D.N.Y.
1938). Moreover, any deviation from the language of the affidavit requirement is an in-
vitation to litigation although the cases raising the question have not resulted in invalida-
tion. Gulf Coast Marine Ways v. The J. R. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379, 386-87 (S.D. Tex.
1952) ; The Nan B., 78 F. Supp. 748 (D. Alaska 1948) ; see The Eastern Temple, 94 F.2d
374, 377 (4th Cir. 1938). The number of other trifling irregularities that can arise are
manifold. Many may stem from the provision requiring enrollment as a vessel of the
United States before preferred status will be granted. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§ 922(a) (1952). The Shipping Code provides that a vessel of the United States is any
ship registered pursuant to law. Rv. STAT. § 4131 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 221
(1952). Registration is governed by chapter two of the Shipping Code, 46 U.S.C. §§ 11-63
(1952), which is so intricate that many American firms have been registering under for-
eign flags to escape it, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U:S. 571, 587 (1953). Indeed, only
judicial refusal to surrender substance to form has prevented the statutory scheme from
becoming useless. See, e.g., Pilgrim Trust Co. v. The Frances C. Denehy, 94 F. Supp.
807, 814-15 (D. Me. 1950) (failure to comply with the requirement that a certified copy
of the mortgage be carried on board ship does not forfeit preferred status) ; Collier
Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Hudson River Day Line, 14 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1936)
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Moreover, inadvertent %waiver of lien priority may occur despite valid re-
cording and indorsement. Section 922 (a) (4) provides that "the mortgage ...
[must] ... not stipulate that the mortgagee waives the preferred status there-
of .... "44 an anomalous provision whose primary function to date has been
harassment of the admiralty bar.45 Any clause in a mortgage which recognizes
superior rights to a vessel may constitute, under section 922 (a) (4), an in-
voluntary relinquishment of preferred standing. For example, a Maritime
Administration regulation requires any mortgage covering a vessel built in an
American shipyard for a foreign owner to acknowledge forfeiture rights in
the United States government.4 The regulation is apparently designed to
protect any interest the United States, or its citizens, might have in the ship
against foreclosure or judicial sales effected without Administration approval.
But since it forces acknowledgment of superior rights in another party, com-
pliance may be deemed tantamount to a waiver under the act.47 Similar loss
of priority might flow from those clauses in mortgages obtained with charter
party assignments by which the mortgagee admits possessory rights in the
vessel's charterer.48 The scope of the statutory waiver has not yet been satis-
factorily defined by the courts.49 Even if delineation were possible, section
922(a) (4), which protects neither shipowner nor unsecured creditor while
(corporate owner required to give a certain oath through its president or secretary; court
rejected the argument that an oath given by the vice-president invalidated the mortgage) ;
The Fort Orange, 5 F. Supp. 833, 841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (statute requires documenta-
tion in corporate president's or secretary's name; held documentation in corporate name
sufficient).
44. 41 STAT. 1001 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) (1952).
45. Simpson, supra note 31, at 173-74. In discussing this clause, a leading treatise
states: "On the face of it, this seems to be an idiotic statement; indeed, it is an idiotic
statement." GILmoaE & BLACK 583.
46. Amend. 2 to Statement of Policy, Fed. Maritime Bd., 22 FED. REG. 7397 (1.957).
47. Simpson, supra note 31, at 173. For a general statement of Maritime Adminis-
tration policy on foreign purchase and operation of American vessels, see 46 C.F.R.
§ 221.13(111) (Supp. 1957).
48. Relying on a series of English cases, The Heather Bell, [1901] P. 272 (.C.A.);
Laming & Co. v. Seater, 16 Sess. Cas. 828 (Scot. 1889) ; Keith v. Burrows, 2 App. Cas.
636 (P.C. 1877); Collins v. Lamport, 34 L.J. Ch. 196, 46 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1864), the
admiralty bar has concluded that such provisions do not amount to waivers, Simpson,
supra note 31, at 173-74. Nineteenth-century foreign decisions seem an unrealistic foun-
dation, however, for an opinion on what an American court, confronted with the act's
"idiotic" waiver provision, will do in the mid-twentieth century.
49. What little case law exists only adds to the confusion; no court has ever made any
sense out of the provision. Compare Atlantic Steamer Supply Co. v. The Tradewind, 144
F. Supp. 408, 418 (D. Md. 1956) (not a waiver to recognize the existence of possible
future liens for repairs and supplies), with The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F.2d 423, 432 (D.
Md. 1927) (clause allowing master to incur liens for supplies constitutes waiver) ; see
Crofton Diesel Engine Co. v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 205 F.2d 950, 951 (9th Cir.
1953) (clause allowing mortgagor to incur debts "for strictly current operations and re-
pairs" does not forfeit preferred status).
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jeopardizing bona fide security transactions, should be deleted from the stat-
ute.
50
Multicollateral transactions encounter further difficulties. Section 922(e)
provides that mixed mortgages covering vessel and shore property which do
not allot a separate discharge figure to the nonmaritime security are ineligible
for preferred standing. 51 In contrast, section 922(f), which requires separate
discharge figures for multivessel mortgages, does not penalize noncompliance
with forfeiture of maritime status.52 Comparison of the two sections indicates
that section 922(e) may in part stem from congressional apprehension of
extending admiralty jurisdiction to encumbrances of nonmaritime propertyr1
The function of separate discharge figures in other contexts-to enable cred-
itors to determine when specific assets are released from prior liens-may
also explain section 922(e)'s enactment. In operation, however, the section
accomplishes neither objective. Since liens on shore property are not protected
by filing mixed mortgages under the act,5 4 the purity of admiralty jurisdiction
would be unimpaired by deletion of the separate discharge requirement. More-
over, the act fails to provide an allocation formula for a borrower's install-
ment payments. 5 The mortgagee is apparently free to apply remittances against
either maritime or nonmaritime security although the only case in point sug-
50. Still another Mortgage Act formality requiring clarification is the limitation of
recordation jurisdiction to liens encumbering "the whole of any vessel of the United
States." 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1952). In The R. Lenahan, 10 F.
Supp. 497, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1935), the clause was interpreted to exclude the vessel's freight.
The decision is sound. In a long term financing arrangement, the mortgagee is not in-
terested in the cargo; therefore it should not be forced on him as a prerequisite to pre-
ferred status. GILMORE & BLACK 583.
51. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1952). If a vessel's freight is en-
cumbered, however, it does not fall under the "property other than a vessel" clause. The
R. Lenahan, supra note 50, at 501.
52. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 922(f) (1952).
53. See The Emma Giles, 15 F. Supp. 502, 508 (D. Md. 1936). At the time § 922 (e)
was drafted, the constitutionality of extending admiralty jurisdiction even to mortgages
of maritime property was doubted. See note 29 supra. See also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.
(21. Wall.) 558, 576 (1874) (admiralty jurisdiction "exclusively a judicial question, and
no ... act of Congress can make it broader . . . than the judicial power may determine
those limits to be").
54. The act expressly limits mortgage validity attained through recordation to the
vessel portion of the lien. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1952).
55. In contrast, § 922(f)'s multivessel clause does contain an allocation formula. The
court is to determine the proportion that the value of the ship in question bears to the value
of all encumbered vessels, then increase the amount constituting the same proportion of
the total mortgage by 20% to arrive at the separate discharge figure. For example, three
ships are mortgaged for $100,000. A libel is filed against Ship A. The court finds Ship A
worth $40,000, Ship B also $40,000 and Ship C $80,000. Ship A's value is one fourth of
the total. Applied to the $100,000 lien, one fourth plus 20% thereof results in a $30,000
separate discharge total. The formula provides some certainty for claimants interested in
determining the amount needed to free their security from the prior mortgage, to the
extent their appraisal substantially coincides with that of the courts.
1032 [Vol. 67:1024
MOBILE EQUIPMENT FINANCING
gests that courts are not bound by his distribution.r6 At any rate, far from
being enlightened by a separate discharge figure, creditors holding secondary
liens on ship or shore property can only ascertain the existence or release of
superior encumbrances by forcing litigation. In practice, financing parties can
easily satisfy section 922(e) or avoid it entirely by drafting separate instru-
ments." Nevertheless, to protect less carefully planned arrangements from a
functionless proscription, as well as to modernize the act, section 922 (e) should
either be eliminated or supplemented with an allocation formula.58
AIRCRAFT
Airline equipment financing has assumed significant proportions only during
the past decade.rO In the aviation industry's formative years, the speculative
nature of its future as well as the difficulty of perfecting liens in every state
through which aircraft were likely to operate made secured financing unattrac-
tive to institutional lenders. 60 Equity capital, government air mail subsidies
,and retained earnings formed the primary sources of funds.61 Enacting section
503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, Congress authorized exclusive recor-
dation of aircraft title and security interests with the CAA.62 But while multi-
state filing difficulties had thus been resolved, and the industry had attained
reliable investment stature, further problems discouraged institutional lenders
from financing the rebuilding program necessitated by the technological ad-
56. The Emma Giles, 15 F. Supp. 502 (D. Md. 1936).
57. The separate instrument solution is probably wisest, especially since no advantages
accrue to a mixed mortgage. GILmORE & BLAcK 581-82. For an example of some of the
difficulties occasioned by a combined lien, see Collier Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Hudson
River Day Line, 14 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
58. Recent developments militate for immediate revision of the entire Mortgage Act.
A huge shipbuilding program is already under way and is expected to continue for at least
the next decade. Business Week, April 26, 1958, pp. 120-33.
59. For a summary of prewar aircraft financing, see Hoadley, Banks Opening Books
to Personal Plane Financing, Av. Week, Sept. 1945, p. 187. For the industry's present
financial position and outlook, see Forbes, Jan. 1, 1958, pp. 23-26; N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1958, p. F.1, col. 8, p. F.4, col. 3.
60. See, generally, Calkins, Creation and International Recognition of Title and
Security Rights in Aircraft, 15 J. Am L. & Com. 156, 157-61 (1948). Until 1.945, the
combined debt of all airlines never exceeded more than $10,000,000 at any one time.
Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security for the Senior Debt of Our Air-
lines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378, 381 (1957). And as of Jan. 1,
1946, no airline had any funded debt. FREDEicCx, Co i~nERaCIA. AiR TRANSPORTATON 452
(rev. ed. 1947).
61. Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing,
13 Bus. LAw. 199 (1958) ; FRmEmvzcK, op. cit. supra note 60, at 452-54.
62. 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523 (1952). For a summary of
the section's historical background, see RHiYNE, CIvIL AERoNAuncs AcT ANNOTATED 150-
52 (1939). See also Mickelson, Aircraft Lien Law and Procedure, 44 ILL. B.J. 863 (1956)
(technical aspects of lien recordation). As used in this Comment, CAA denotes the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, which is the department in charge of aircraft lien recorda-
tion. See Historical Note following 49 U.S.C.A. § 523 (1951).
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vances and equipment depreciation of World War 11.63 Airplane titleholders
are subject to strict liability for tort damages. 64 Lenders retaining title for
security purposes would, accordingly, risk damage suits for injuries inflicted by
encumbered planes.65 Under conditional sales and equipment lease arrange-
ments, a secured party is legally the owner until the debt is retired. 6 A chattel
mortgagee's status depends on whether the relevant jurisdiction follows the
"title" or "lien" theory of mortgages.6 7 Obviously safest of the three devices,
the chattel mortgage was almost exclusively used in the few pre- and postwar
financing arrangements executed.68 Nevertheless, until a 1948 amendment to
the Civil Aeronautics Act removed the tort liability obstacle, large-scale
financing was needlessly curtailed.6 9
Another factor marking 1948 as the turning point in airline financing was
the "basket lien" amendment to section 503.7 0 Apart from potential tort lia-
bility, postwar financing was hindered by the Civil Aeronautics Act's failure
to provide for centralized filing of basket liens covering airline spare parts in-
ventories.7' Mortgages on spares, often worth twenty-five per cent of a plane's
63. Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing,
13 Bus. LAW. 199 (1958).
64. This rule obtains under both the common law, Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112
F. Supp. 306, 312 (D.N.J. 1953), and the UI'nroRiu AERONAUTiCS AcT § 5, in force in
twenty-one jurisdictions, 9 UmFoRm LAWs ANN. p. xix.
65. No case has arisen in which liability was imposed on a security titleholder. Still,
the fear of liability definitely existed, FREDEliCK, op. cit. sitpra note 60, at 460-61; Hines,
Legal Difficulties in Secured Airline Equipment Financing, 15 J. AIR L. & Com. 11, 15
(1948), and impeded airline financing for many years. Similar fears attended early auto-
mobile and truck financing but were dispelled as courts almost uniformly held that the
security titleholder was not an "owner" for tort or other liability purposes. See, e.g.,
Hurnanen v. Nicksa, 228 Mass. 346, 117 N.E. 325 (1917) ; State v. One Pontiac Coach
Automobile, 55 S.D. 8, 224 N.W. 176 (1929).
66. See, e.g., Enterprise Fuel Co. v. Jones, 99 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1938); Helena
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Interstate Grocer Co., 196 Ark. 454, 118 S.W.2d 857 (1938)
Manlove v. Maggart, 111 Ind. App. 398, 41 N.E.2d 633 (1942).
67. "Title" states deem the mortgagee the legal owner. See, e.g., Manufacturers'
Finance Acceptance Corp. v. Woods, 222 Ala. 329, 330, 132 So. 611, 612 (1930) ; People
v. Scudder, 177 App. Div. 225, 163 N.Y. Supp. 739 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 670, 117
N.E. 1080 (1917) ; Howard v. McPhail, 37 R.I. 21, 23, 91 Atl. 12, 13 (1914). On the other
hand, "lien" theory jurisdictions hold that title remains vested in the mortgagor. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank v. Yuma Nat'l Bank, 30 Ariz. 188, 192, 245 Pac. 277, 278 (1926) ; Hill-
man v. Morton, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 198 (1887) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 10 (Supp. 1957).
68. Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security for the Senior Debt of Our
Airlines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378, 381-82 (1957).
69. 62 STAT. 470 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 524 (1952). Statutory coverage is limited to
the United States. Nevertheless, liability insurance can afford adequate protection against
damages caused in international flight. Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial
Aircraft Equipment Financing, 13 Bus. LAw. 199, 208 (1958).
70. 62 STAT. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 523 (1952).
71. Hines, supra note 65, at 17-19. Mr. Hines' proposed draft of a statutory amend-
ment was substantially adopted by Congress. See id. at 25. See, generally, FR.DEMCK, op.
cit. supra note 60, at 456-57.
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value, not only enhance collateral but preclude other lenders from foreclosing
liens on equipment needed to generate debt retirement funds.72 Since financers
are as interested in a borrower's ability to repay as in the market value of the
collateral,7" institutional credit became accessible to the airline industry once
basket lien perfection with the CAA was authorized.74 The chattel mortgage,
which gained currency under the threat of tort liability, has proven the most
useful device to secure both aircraft and equipment.7 5
72. Since aviation equipment rapidly depreciates unless operated, and is subject to
strict governmental inspection and overhaul regulations, see id. at c. 13, aircraft are im-
mobile, and consequently unable to generate debt retirement funds, without a substantial
parts inventory, see N.Y. Times, May 26, 1958, p. 29, col. 1 (spare parts keep aircraft
"ageless").
73. Financers generally insist that aircraft spares be included in their security in-
terest. See Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Comnwercial Aircraft Equipment Financ-
ing, 13 Bus. LAW. 199, 203 (1958). Even before basket liens were available, financers
carefully examined the airline's plans for maintaining spare parts inventories before ap-
proving a loan. FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 60, at 456.
74. Another reason underlying enactment of the basket lien provision was to conform
with the Convention on International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, June 19, 1948,
T.I.A.S. No. 2847 (effective Sept. 17, 1953). For an annotated text of the Convention,
see 16 J. Air L. & Com. 70 (1949). For discussion, see Wilberforce, The International
Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, 2 INT"L L.Q. 421 (1.948). Article X recognizes spare
,parts liens if valid under local law. Shortly before the Convention draft was signed, the
American delegate published an article in which he pointed to the need for conforming
federal legislation. Calkins, supra note 60, at 178 (also discusses the Convention's historical
background and analyzes the major sections). Undoubtedly, his article influenced congres-
sional action since the basket lien provision was passed simultaneously with the United
States' signing of the Convention. While a great improvement on existing law, the Con-
vention unfortunately has had little practical effect since only six nations have ratified it,
and two, Chile and Mexico, have included reservations making their ratification unaccept-
able to the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FoRCE 152 (1955).
Section 503 has two separate provisions for recording liens on engines. Section 503
(a) (2) allows specific liens against aircraft engines of more than 750 rated take-off
horsepower. Section 503(a) (3) provides that any engine may be encumbered under a gen-
eral basket lien. In practice, liens on engines meeting the statutory specification are al-
ways separately recorded. The double perfection provision is included to conform with
the Convention. Hines, supra note 65, at 21-22. To obviate possible confusion, § 503(d)
gives liens on specific engines recorded under § 503(a) (2) preference over prior as well
as subsequent basket lien encumbrances perfected under § 503(a) (3).
75. Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equtipment Financing,
13 Bus. LAW. 199, 200-01 (1958). Conditional sales financing is inexpedient because parts
are manufactured by many different firms. Several contracts would always be required,
the total varying with the number of different sellers. And eaoiinment leasing is not readily
adaptable to encumbering small parts.
However, because of the complexities involved in hypothecating both equipment and
parts, some of the stronger airlines have obtained funds through unsecured debenture bond
sales to institutional investors. Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security for
the Senior Debt of Our Airlines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378,
390 (1957).
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Statutory Defects
Limited to recordation functions, section 503 fails to protect basket liens
from Benedict v. Ratner strictures.7" The Benedict doctrine, followed by many
state courts 77 and generally operative in bankruptcy,78 invalidates security
arrangements which permit borrowers to exercise dominion over encumbered
chattels or proceeds of their sale. The manipulation of spare parts inventory
necessitated by airline operations could easily be viewed as dominion incon-
sistent with the existence of a valid lien.1 9 And while Benedict may be satis-
fied in other contexts by substituting inventory of equal value for dissipated
security or by promptly remitting proceeds of sale,80 neither practice may be
feasible in the aviation industry. For example, a Company A plane needing
a new component might land at an airfield containing only a Company B com-
76. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). For discussion of Benedict in the closely analogous inven-
tory financing field, see Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 392 (1952) ; see also Comment, 67 YALE
L.J. 847, 877-88 (1958) (contractual assignments). Its possible applicability to spare parts
financing is disturbing counsel for institutional lenders financing the commercial airlines.
Despite the existence of § 503, some banks have deliberately foregone basket liens to
avoid the danger of invalidation. Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security
for the Senior Debt of Our Airlines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378,
390-91 (1957).
77. See, e.g., Stulz-Sickles Co. v. Fredburn Constr. Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 475, 169 At.
27 (Ch. 1933); Chambers v. Hot Lake Sanatorium, 151 Ore. 20, 45 P.2d 1045 (1935);
In re Advance Woodwork Co., 231 Wis. 260, 285 N.W. 747 (1939). See also Note, 24
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 598 (1949). States partially or totally repudiating Benedict are listed
in Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 417 n.45 (1958). In deciding Benedict, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis purported to apply New York law. 268 U.S. at 360-61. Commentators have since
argued that the case was not supported by the law of that state. 2 GLExN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 592-93 (rev. ed. 1940); Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages
of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEo. L.J. 555, 559-62 (1941). Some commentators have con-
cluded that Benedict has become a part of the federal common law. 4 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY ff 70.77, at 1396 (14th ed. 1942) ; Cohen & Gerber, supra at 562-63.
78. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 77, at f1 70.77; Lowenstein, Assignments of Ac-
counts Receivable ad the Banikruptcy Act, 1 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 11 (1947). All fed-
eral circuit courts probably recognize Benedict; in many the doctrine is frequently em-
ployed. See Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951) ; Irving Trust
Co. v. Finance Serv. Co., 63 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1933) ; It re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co.,
122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941); Union Trust Co. v. Peck, 16 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1927);
M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923, 925 n.1. (5th Cir. 1955) ; In re Allied Prod-
ucts Co., 134 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Ed Hughes Furniture Co. v. Caughran, 218 F.2d
906 (7th Cir. 1955) ; McCluer v. Heim-Overly Realty Co., 71 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1934) ;
Scandanavian-American Bank v. Sabin, 227 Fed. 579 (9th Cir. 1915) (pre-Benedict ap-
plication of doctrine) ; Midwest Production Co. v. Doerner, 70 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1934).
79. For example, the parts are installed or removed at many different terminals both
here and abroad, are freely exchanged between the airlines and are interchanged with
privately operated central maintenance bases where a substantial portion of the major re-
pair work is performed. Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security for the
Senior Debt of Our Airlines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378, 390-91
(1957).
80. Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HAtv. L. REv. 588,
596, 598 (1949) ; Cohen & Gerber, supra note 77, at 567-68.
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plete parts depot.8 ' Once installed, the new fixture would be covered by the
plane mortgage, the collateral securing a basket lien on Company B's inven-
tory correspondingly diminished. Although adjustments between all airlines for
similar replacements need be eventually effected, constant maintenance of air-
line inventory at prescribed levels, or immediate payment for displaced equip-
ment, may be commercially impracticable.8 2 Moreover, a company's use of
its own encumbered inventory for aircraft repairs might also constitute a
Benedict violation. True, the installation of spare parts might only represent
a shift of collateral between two liens-airplane and basket mortgages-held
by the same financer. But even if accretion in the plane's value equalled de-
pletion in inventory, such substitution might not preclude formal application
of the Benedict rule.
Benedict's potential application to airline financing should, therefore, be
foreclosed. Two interpretations of Benedict's equivocal rationale pertain to
spare parts mortgages.8 3 Courts have explained the doctrine as premised on
the conceptual incompatability of an absolute conveyance with unfettered
dominion in the transferor.8 4 If, in fact, Benedict rests on mere conceptualism,
its displacement by pragmatic goals would sacrifice only logical symmetry. On
the other hand, Benedict may be viewed as embodying a policy against "too
easy" security transfers 85 which in its original context-accounts receivable
financing-complements the interests of institutional assignees. In receivables
transactions, Benedict requirements represent minimal standards which re-
sponsible lenders would observe absent the decision to prevent dissipation of
collateral.80 As a legal requirement, the doctrine facilitates their patrolling the
conduct of assignors who may otherwise feel they are being distrusted.8 7 Air-
line financers, too, demand that the initial mortgaged level of spare parts in-
ventory be maintained.88 But if mortgagors were required to replace parts
immediately after installation-as assignors must substitute accounts-the too
81. See, generally, FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 60, at 637.
82. The manifold variety and number of airframe and engine parts would militate
against prediction of a given plane's replacement needs sufficiently accurate to insure im-
mediate payment or substitution.
83. A third prevailing interpretation of Benedict-to prevent fraudulent backdating
of accounts, see Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 434 (1958)-is not relevant to the discussion
in text.
84. See L. Hand, J., in Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1926) : "[T]he doc-
trine [of Benedict v. Ratner] has nothing to do with ostensible ownership. Therefore it
can rest only upon some supposed conceptual repugnancy between the mortgage and the
reserved power, quite regardless of any evils which may result from their coupling."
85. Gilmore, Chattel Secnrity: I1, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 777 n.58 (1948).
86. Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 405 n.17 (1958).
87. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMERCIAL RECEIVABLE COMPANIES, INC., EIGHTH
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE COmmERCIAL FINANCE INDUSTRY 170-74 (1952); cf. Mal-
colm, Explanation and Anolysis of Massachusetts House Bill No. 642, Mass. L.Q., Oct.
1945, pp. 26, 37.
88. See FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 60, at 456.
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easy rationale could operate to make spare parts financing impossible.89 Some
courts may realize that one industry's useful practices spell impracticality for
the airlines and permit greater time for replenishing collateral. Yet to avoid
needless invalidation under strict adherence to Benedict, basket liens should
be insulated from the rule.
Protection of security interests during the usual time lapse between mailing
and receipt for recording is also indicated. Section 503 holds liens perfected
from the date of their "filing for recordation."90 The ambiguity inherent in
this phrase is illustrated in a recent California decision.91 A mortgage mailed
February 9th was received by the CAA on February 14th and forwarded to
its Administrative and Records Branch on February 15th. Because of a tech-
nical error, the mortgage was returned. The mortgagee corrected the error
and refiled on March 4th. In the meantime, intervening interests had at-
tached. While the court dated perfection from February 15th, thus upholding
the security interest, the potential vulnerability of other aircraft liens was re-
vealed.92 Loss or delay in the mails, or any time lapse during intradepart-
mental transmission, represent significant risks to the financing party.93 The
danger can be avoided in major transactions by correlating execution with
simultaneous recordation in Washington. But coordinating central perfection
with execution at a geographically distant point would be impractical for small
89. See -note 82 supra.
90. 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1952).
91. Kerley Chemical Corp. v. Colboch, 145 Cal. App. 2d 509, 302 P.2d 621 (1956).
92. Although this court dated perfection from the time of original receipt, another
might find perfection effective when the corrected instrument was remailed or refiled. See
Anderson v. Triair Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. R. 440 (Milw. Cty. Ct. 1947) (lengthy
delays by CAA in recording mortgage caused subordination of lien) ; cf. Maryland Credit
Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance Coup., 164 Va. 579, 180 S.E. 408 (1935) (motor
truck lien recordation).
93. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), operates in conjunction with § 70(e) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952), to avoid
security interests in toto where any other creditor, however small his claim, has a superior
right in the collateral under state or federal law. See notes 157-59 infra and accompany-
ing text. Thus, interests which attach during the interim between execution and filing of
an aircraft security instrument could occasion total invalidation under Bay and § 503 should
bankruptcy ensue. In major transactions, informed airline counsel would insist that inter-
vening liens be discharged so that no creditor with a superior claim to the collateral could
exist in the event of subsequent bankruptcy. But in small arrangements, financers are
not likely to become aware of intervening interests. Moreover, invalidation in bankruptcy
may conceivably occur even absent an actual interim creditor. See discussion of Constance
v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), notes 160-65 infra and accompanying text. Since
Constance is based on state law, it would be applicable only if § 503 leaves state substan-
tive law on perfection unimpaired. More likely, however, § 503 supersedes substantive
law arising out of state recordation acts by superseding the statutes themselves. See,
generally, Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipnwnt Financ-




plane financings . 4 The problem should be resolved by statutory amendment
permitting promptly mailed instruments to be perfected from the time of ex-
ecution. 5 Similarly, provision should be made for validating an improper but
good faith filing from the date of original execution if the error is corrected,
and the papers refiled, within a reasonable time.96
Amendment should also rectify the act's overprotection of secured financers
in relation to mechanics lienors. Priority between security interests and sub-
sequently acquired mechanics liens is a traditional problem of commercial law.
Section 503, providing that recorded instruments shall be valid against "all
persons," apparently resolves the conflict in favor of secured parties.9 7 Of the
two cases arising under the act, one strictly applied the statutory language 98
while the other preferred the mechanics lienor on a constructive notice tech-
nicality. 9 Neither approach complements the policy considerations involved.
Arguably, mortgagees should not be subordinated to liens arising from col-
lateral repairs to which they have not consented. On the other hand, mechanic's
94. See, generally, Mickelson, Aircraft Lien Law and Procedure, 44 ILL B.J. 863
(1956).
95. To accord with the Bankruptcy Act's § 60(a) (7) delayed perfection provision,
30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (7) (1952), a twenty-one day delay
should be the maximum allowable period.
96. Another congressional oversight needing correction is the recent § 116(5) "airline"
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 71 STAT. 617 (1957), 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (Supp. V,
1958), providing that the title of a lessor or conditional vendor of aircraft shall not be
impaired by bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. Railroad financers have enjoyed a
similar provision for years, 49 STAT. 922 (1935), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(j) (1952),
which has facilitated equipment financing under lease or conditional sale arrangements.
The instant amendment, also designed to encourage commercial investment, is practically
useless in its present form. For it does not cover chattel mortgages, the most extensively
employed airline security device. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. The error may
iprove unsubstantial if airline counsel can frame a combination plane lease and parts
mortgage. A better solution, obviating the necessity for encumbering planes separately
from their parts inventory, would be congressional insertion of a clause protecting a chat-
tel mortgage under § 116(5). For discussion, see Adkins & Billyou, Developnents in
Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing, 13 Bus. LAW. 199, 208-12 (1958). An ad-
ditional advantage of integrated encumbrancing would be avoidance of possible application
of Benedict v. Ratner strictures when parts are shifted from inventory to plane. See text
following note 82 supra.
97. 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1952).
98. In re Veterans Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948) (mortgage re-
corded prior to performance of repair work held superior to mechanics lien).
99. United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948) (plane
mortgage omitting description of specific engines removed for repairs held not to protect
these parts against a mechanics lien arising from the work done) ; cf. Anderson v. Triair
Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. R. (Milw. Cty. Ct. 1947). But cf. Modern Air Transport,
Inc. v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., 20 N.J. Super. 609, 90 A.2d 108 (L. 1952) (state statute
giving mechanics lien to plane repairman held inapplicable to engirie repairs; mortgage
recordation not an issue). Under existing law, engines not enumerated in aircraft mort-
gages may automatically be encumbered by basket liens. See note 74 supra. Yet United
Aircraft still pertains to all undescribed parts when the airplane mortgagee does not hold
a basket lien on spare equipment.
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repairs economically benefit the secured party. An equitable solution might
appear to lie in requiring mechanics to obtain a financer's permission before
commencing work on the equipment.100 But since airline maintenance work is
often performed far from the lender's office, mechanics are unlikely to know
that a lien exists and financers most probably do not want needed repairs to
await their approval. Priority should be accorded to artisans whose services
enhance or preserve the value of the collateral.' 0'
RAILROADS
Railroad rolling stock is usually financed under Philadelphia Plan Equip-
ment Trusts.10 2 In the early days of railroad financing, a security device was
needed to circumvent the after-acquired property clauses then contained in
most mortgages.10 3 Since these provisions automatically encumbered railroad
property as it came into the debtor's possession, financers refused to lend on
the basis of newly acquired equipment.0 4 To promote credit, railroads offered
conditional sales contracts which lodged legal title in the seller or, through
his assignment, the financing party.10 5 However, the refusal of Pennsylvania
100. This view is frequently enunciated in motor vehicle cases. See, e.g., Champa v.
Consolidated Finance Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289 (1953); Commercial Credit
Co. v. Williams, 174 Okla. 160, 50 P.2d 141 (1935); City Finance Co. v. Perry, 195 Tenn.
81, 257 S.W.2d 1 (1953).
101. This policy has been adopted by the UNIFORM COMMaERCIAL CODE § 9-310 (1957
draft), and by many courts in the more frequently litigated motor vehicle field. Theories
justifying the decisions vary. Some courts consider the lender to have impliedly consented
to all necessary repairs or to have made the borrower his agent to contract therefor. See,
e.g., Weber Implement & Auto Co. v. Pearson, 132 Ark. 101, 200 S.W. 273 (1917); New
Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 Atl. 780 (1925);
Guaranty Security Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 N.E. 751 (1923) ; Ruppert v. Zang,
73 N.J.L. 216, 62 Atl. 998 (Sup. Ct. 1906). Others reach the same result by finding a
legislative intent to accord absolute priority to mechanics liens. See, e.g., Mortgage
Securities Co. v. Pfaffmann, 177 Cal. 109, 169 Pac. 1033 (1917) ; Stebbins v. Balfour, 157
Minn. 135, 195 N.W. 773 (1923); New Hampshire Finance Co. v. LaMarche, 85 N.H.
205, 155 Atl. 697 (1931) ; Crosier v. Cudihee, 85 Wash. 237, 147 Pac. 1146 (1915).
102. In 1.941, one authority estimated that 98% of all railroad equipment purchases
were so financed. DEvING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 207 (4th ed. 1941). Ad-
ditionally, there are three other devices-the straight conditional sale, the equipment bond
or "New York Plan" equipment trust, and the leaseback-none of which have much im-
portance in railroad financing arrangements. 2 id. at 204 n.n (5th ed. 1953). For a com-
plete discussion of the early growth and development of equipment trust financing, see
DuxcAN, EQUIPMENT OBLIGATIONS C. 2 (1924). Wartime developments, however, have
generated some new financing arrangements. See note 108 infra.
103. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL Am TRANSPORTATION 459 (rev. ed. 1947). The limited
period of validity given to chattel mortgages in some jurisdictions, necessitating cumber-
some redrawing and refiling of instruments, also contributed to the development of the
equipment trust. Billyou, Federal Railroad Equipment Legislation, 64 HARv. L. Rsv. 608,
609 (1951).
104. FREDERIcK, op. cit. szpra note 103, at 459.
105. DAvis & BaowNE, CAR TRusTs IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1894).
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and Illinois, both important railroading jurisdictions, to recognize these con-
tracts necessitated the development of an alternative instrument. 0 6 Thus, the
car lease, actually a modified conditional sale, was adopted and eventually con-
verted into the equipment trust now successfully employed in most railroad
financings.10 7 As the scheme is presently conceived, a corporate fiduciary takes
title to the rolling stock as trustee and leases it to the railroad. Certificates
representing pro rata shares of the lease are sold and the proceeds, accom-
panied by the railroad's down payment, are used to pay the equipment manu-
facturer. The railway's remaining indebtedness is discharged through annual
rental payments which cover all interest, principal and trust expenses. After
final payment, the lease is terminated and legal title deeded to the railroad.,0 8
Although equipment trusts were initially insulated from conditional sale or
chattel mortgage filing requirements, general railroad legislation in all states
made recordation mandatory. 10 9 Since virtually all railroads either operate on
an interstate basis or exchange rolling stock with interstate carriers, multistate
106. See Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill. 487 (186) ; Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275 (Pa.
1819). Kentucky also refused to uphold such conditional sales contracts. Baldwin & Co.
v. Crow, 86 Ky. 679, 7 S.W. 146 (1838).
107. Early railroad financing met with a series of rebuffs at the hands of federal
courts. In Heryford v. Davis, 102 U.S. 235 (1880), the court invalidated a contract in-
tended as a car lease by deeming it a chattel mortgage void for want of recordation.
See also Hart v. Barney & Smith Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. 543 (6th Cir. 1881). Although in
Harkness v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663 (1886), the Supreme Court validated a conditional sale
of railroad equipment, it subsequently retrogressed in Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v.
Merchants' Bank, 136 U.S. 268, 280-83 (1390), and overturned a title retention security
transaction. The flurry of litigation ceased after the passage of the state railroad equip-
ment trust recording acts and soon these contracts were everywhere recognized as valid.
Billyou, supra note 103, at 609.
Exempted from subordination or down scaling during reorganization proceedings by
both the Bankruptcy Act, 49 STAT. 922 (1935), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(j) (1952),
and the Interstate Commerce Act, 62 STAT. 163 (1948), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20b(1)
(1952), equipment trusts became prime security.
108. Adkins & Billyou, Current Developments in Railroad Equipmnent Financing, 12
Bus. LAW. 207 (1957). Wartime pressures have engendered variations on the basic plan.
The most important developments are: (1) the straight equipment lease whereby the rail-
road never takes title to the equipment but avoids the down payment and gains certain
tax advantages; (2) conditional sales where an institutional investor buys the manufac-
turer's paper directly rather than have the railroad secure funds by floating equipment trust
certificates through a corporate trustee; and (3) rebuilding old equipment with funds
obtained through regular conditional sale or equipment trust arrangements. Id. at 209-12.
The conditional sale has become particularly popular because it is not subject to ICC
supervision under § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 20a (1952). Lehigh Valley R.R. Conditional Sales Contract, 233 LC.C. 359
(1939).
109. Starting with Ohio in 1882 and ending with Nevada in 1913, all states enacted
statutory provisions relating to recordation of conditional sales and leases of railroad
equipment. DUNCAN, EnUIPMENT OBLIGATIONS 324-29 (1-924) (omission of Maryland
probably inadvertent since that state also had enacted a pertinent statute, Md. Laws 1910,
c. 438, p. 64).
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lien perfection difficulties attended state regulation." 0 As a practical matter,
railroad financers restricted filing to states in which equipment was regularly
employed."' Even this limitation, however, occasioned exorbitant costs that
became intolerable as railroad activities expanded." 2 Finally, in 1952, Con-
gress added section 20c to the Interstate Commerce Act, which made recor-
dation of railroad equipment liens with the ICC nationally effective."13
Statutory Defects
Although section 20c remedies most of the industry's filing problems, more
extensive treatment is necessary. The section's provisions are permissive."14
Presumably, most railroad equipment liens are now filed exclusively wit i the
ICC. Yet the act's failure to supplant state recordation systems forces careful
financing institutions to examine both local and federal files. More important
is the exclusion from the act of railroad fixed property encumbrances. While
other carrier real property is geographically distinct and easily allocable to
separate mortgages, contiguous railroad property, sometimes extending over
300 recording districts, cannot practicably be subdivided for local recorda-
tion."i5 The alternative, filing a blanket mortgage in every district containing
110. For example, many states enacted conditional sales acts subsequent to their equip-
ment trust legislation. Whether these had superseded the earlier car trust recordation acts
was never resolved. Thus, many railroads complied with both statutes in such states.
Billyou, supra note 103, at 612.
111. Id. at 611.
112. Filing in approximately twenty-five separate offices was generally necessary at
a cost of $400 to $500 per recordation, or a total of $10,000 to $12,500 for perfection alone.
S. REP. No. 1676, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
113. 66 STAT. 724, 49 U.S.C. § 2 0c (1952). No litigation under § 20c has as yet arisen,
all disputes having been settled at an administrative level. Immediately after the act was
passed, the question arose whether firms other than railroads could record documents with
the Commission. At first the ICC hesitated, then recanted and permitted recordation of
any security instrument which met the statutory standards regardless of the recorder's
business. Billyou, The Federal Railroad Equipment Recording Statute, 20 ICC PRAc. J.
216, 217 n.8 (1952). This position was then formalized by regulation. 17 F.D. REG. 9143
(1952). However, the ICC has denied permission to record truck-trailer conditional sales
contracts tied to "piggy-back" service (trucks carried on railroad cars). Interstate Com-
merce Commission Order, Feb. 11, 1958, Recordation of Conditional Sale Agreement and
Assignment Respecting Trailers To Be Used in Piggy-Back Service.
114. The statutory language is: "Any mortgage . . . may be filed . . and such in-
strument . . . need not be otherwise filed . . . ." 66 STAT. 724, 49 U.S.C. § 20c (1952).
Identical language in a bill providing for central recording of motor truck liens, S. 2031,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), was specifically criticized as being permissive by the Chair-
man of the ICC. Hearings, supra note 12, at 28. Contrast the air recordation act's phrase-
ology that: "No conveyance ... shall be valid ... until such conveyance or other instru-
ment is filed for recordation . . . ." 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 52 3(c)
(1952), United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948) (§ 503
precludes state recordation).
1.15. See Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of Security for the Senior Debt
of Our Airlines and Railroads: Floating Charges, 12 Bus. LAW. 378, 389-90 (1957).
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railway realty, entails exorbitant fees which are usually geared to the number
of words or pages in the instrument. 116 Thus, centralized federal perfection
for all railroad security transactions seems appropriate. Another revision of
the statutory scheme should be protection of security interests during the delay
between mailing and recordation as was suggested for the Civil Aeronautics
Act."17
TRucKs
Severe credit shortgages primarily attributable to multistate lien perfection
difficulties frustrate expansion of the trucking industry."18 Truck financing
now parallels that in the rail and air industries prior to congressional enact-
ment of centralized filing statutes. 119 When new equipment purchases are
financed, conditional sales contracts, and to some extent leases, are generally
preferred, while security in the form of previously acquired equipment is usual-
116. See, e.g., CAL. GovT CODE §§ 27361, 27361.5; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 115, § 21 (Supp.
1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 836 (Supp. 1957). Some states also impose privilege
taxes on recordation, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1.174 (Stupp. 1957) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-4102, item S(b) (Supp. 1957), which add substantially to recordation expense.
117. See notes 90-96 supra and accompanying text. Fortunately, in the railroad field,
the time lapse problem is not serious. Since most financing transactions assume major
proportions, the marginal cost of recording instruments simultaneously with their execu-
tion is relatively nominal. Also, § 20c overprotects railroads against mechanics lienors.
See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text. Again, the problem is not significant in
context, railroad repair work generally being done in company shops. See HENRY, THxS
FAScINATING RAILROAD BusINEss c. 17 (1942).
118. S. REP. No. 553, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1953). Institutional lenders consider
a motor vehicle lien fully protected only when it has been properly filed in all 1300 United
States counties. While some financers are willing to compromise on recordation limited
to the truck's regular operational radius, most refuse to lend on the security of motor trucks
because of the virtual impossiblity of fully perfecting these liens. S. REP. No. 701, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957); 101 CONG. REc. 8634 (1955); Hearings, supra note 12, at 49.
The problem is not one of insufficient collateral. Trucks can be good debt security. A
constant market exists; their mobility permits easy relocation to the best resale market;
obsolescence does not pose a serious threat; and economical repairs minimize the depre-
ciation factor. TAFF, COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 101 (rev. ed. 1955). For dis-
cussion of the industry's financial position and prospects, see REGULAR COMMON CARRIER
CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN TRUcKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., FINANCING THE MOTOR
CARRIER INDUSTRY (1952).
119. Recordation problems aside, existing security devices have functioned with reason-
able success in the equipment financing field. Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.T.
761, 782 (1948). None of the inherent defects in existing security instruments are present.
For the sale is to a consumer for use, not resale; the collateral is specifically identifiable,
and hence no shifting stock or floating lien problems arise; the security is usually not fully
depreciated before the underlying obligation is discharged; and few after-acquired property
difficulties arise because separate instruments can feasibly be executed when property later
coming into the debtor's possession is to be additional collateral. Gilmore & Axelrod,
Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 540, 547 (1948) ; see also In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d
555, 556 (2d Cir. 1929) (numerous motor vehicles encumbered under three different security
devices-conditional sale, chattel mortgage and trust receipt).
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ly evidenced by a chattel mortgage.1 20 Prevailing conflicts doctrine, however,
forces financing parties to record these instruments in every state in which
trucks are likely to operate. The validity of liens against a trucker's unsecured
creditors, and thus his trustee in bankruptcy, nearly always depends on the
le.r situs-the law of the place where the chattel is located.' 2 ' Since truck liens
120. See TAFF, op. cit. supra note 118, at 103-04. Since truck mortgages, but not
conditional sales contracts, must be approved by the ICC, the latter instrument has addi-
tional utility in purchase money transactions. Wilson Truck Co., 63 M.C.C. 223 (1954).
Leasing arrangements, not subject to lien perfection difficulties, are also gaining popularity
in purchase financing. Business Week, Jan. 24, 1953, p. 50. Approximately 40% of the
equipment presently used by interstate carriers is leased. Hearings, supra note 12, at 29.
For discussion of this practice and rules promulgated to curb developing abuses, see Ex
parte No. MC-43, Lease and Interchange of Vehicles by Motor Carriers, 52 M.C.C. 675
(1951), aff'd, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
See also Taff, Developments iz the Leasing of Motor Truck Equipment, 17 So. EcoN. J.
50 (1950).
121. In the Matter of Hayes, 140 F. Supp. 444, 447 (D. Alaska 1956) ; Morris Plan
Co. v. Jenkins, 216 S.W.2d 160 (,Mo. Ct. App. 1948) ; Burke v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 Okla.
52, 168 P.2d 285 (1946); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 265, 272, 279 (1934).
The inconvenience of situs recordation for a multistate truck fleet is strikingly illustrated
by a recent Railway Express Agency transaction. The Agency's motor vehicle program
was initiated by a purchase of 3000 trucks for use in thirty-one states and the District
of Columbia under a conditional sales financing arrangement. Before approving the trans-
action, the lender insisted that opinion of counsel be obtained on lien validity in each
state. Counsel refused to give an opinion except for lender's own jurisdiction because of
the complexity and diversity in state recordation laws. Consequently, opinions of local
counsel in thirty-one jurisdictions had to be obtained, delaying the transaction and adding
substantially to its cost. Hearigs, supra note 12, at 44.
However, perfection is properly effected in the permanent situs jurisdiction when a
chattel is temporarily elsewhere at time of contracting or when fixed relocation in a second
state is contemplated. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1877);
Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Timmer, 71 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1934) ; James Beggs & Co.
v. Bartels, 73 Conn. 132, 46 AtI. 874 (1900) ; see Johnson v. Sauerman Bros., Inc., 243 Ky.
587, 49 S.W.2d 331 (1932) (when chattel is to be relocated for a brief period in one state
and then permanently in another, lien is to be perfected where it will be principally used) ;
see also Lee, Conflict of Laws Relating to Installment Sales, 41 Micn. L. R'. 445, 446-47
(1942). Courts have applied the law of the permanent situs even though the contract was
executed in the original situs jurisdiction before the chattel had been relocated and the
parties had stipulated that the le.x loci contractus-here the law of the original situs state
-- &as to govern. Stern v. Drew, 285 Fed. 925 (D.C. Cir. 1922) ; H. G. Craig & Co. v.
Uncas Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 At. 673 (1926) ; see also United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Northwest Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927). Contra,
Rubin v. Gallagher, 294 Mich. 124, 292 N.W. 584 (1940).
Occasionally, courts have confused lex loci contractus with lex situs in holding that
if the chattel is located in the jurisdiction where the contract is executed, contemplation
of permanent removal is irrelevant and original situs recordation is necessary. Mergen-
thaler Linotype Co. v. Hull, 239 Fed. 26 (1st Cir. 1916) ; Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v.
Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933) (authority questioned in The
Budget Plan, Inc. v. Sterling A. Orr, Inc., 334 Mass. 599, 601 n.1, 137 N.E.2d 918, 920
n.1 (1956), and overruled by the Uniform Commercial Code, MAss. A-N. LAws c. 106,
§ 9-103 (3) (effective Oct. 1, 1958)) ; cf. Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N.Y. 174, 158 N.E.




are invalid unless perfected by filing, instruments must be initially recorded
in those jurisdictions in which the collateral is located when the security trans-
action is executed. 12 2 The possibility of contracts in states observing other
rules-ler domicili,2 3 lex loci contractus 124 or lexr loci commerciendi 125__
may necessitate further recordation at this time.12 6
122. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 265, 272 (1934). Most likely, bank
counsel will insist that as many vehicles as possible be assembled in one jurisdiction for
original recordation purposes. This practice alleviates the complex administrative diffi-
culties of attempting simultaneously to perfect security instruments on vehicles dispersed
throughout the country, but it badly disrupts carrier operations.
123. Although judicially abandoned at the end of the nineteenth century, lex domicili
or mobilia sequuntur personain-the law of the owner's domicile-has been statutorily
revived in four states. All four statutes provide that "If there is no law to the contrary,
in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile." CAL. Crv. CODE § 946; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 1957); 'MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1101 (Stipp. 1957); N.D.
REv. CODE § 47-0701 (Supp. 1949). Accordingly, a carrier domiciled in any of these four
states who encumbers collateral located in any of the other three has to perfect the lien
at his domicile.
Generally, however, lex domicili has been repudiated in chattel security transactions.
For example, compare Lally v. Holland, 31 Tenn. 396 (1852), with Newsum v. Hoffman,
124 Tenn. 369, 137 S.W. 490 (1911) ; see also Keller v. Paine, 107 N.Y. 83, 13 N.E. 635
(1887) (court noted that lex domnicili was the then prevailing rule but recognized increas-
ing applicability of lex situs in chattel cases) ; ZAPHiROU, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELs
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-24 (1956). Contra, Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky,
222 U.S. 63 (1911) (ocean vessel, lacking real situs, is governed by law of owner's domi-
cile).
124. In chattel transfer cases testing interests in the property, the law of the place
where the contract is executed is applied only in Iowa and South Dakota and there ap-
parently only when litigation involves the immediate contracting parties or third parties
with knowledge of the transaction. Kusser v. Sioux City Horse & Mule Co., 199 Iowa
200, 200 N.W. 404 (1924) ; Holt v. Mahoney, 60 S.D. 158, 244 N.W. 98 (1932) ; Grieme
v. Robkes, 45 S.D. 480, 188 N.W. 745 (1922). To the extent lex loci contractws is so
confined, recordation in the contracting state would be unnecessary to protect liens in Iowa
and South Dakota since security interests are everywhere valid, absent filing, inter sese
or against actually informed third parties. Martin v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 245 U.S.
513 (1918) ; Dale v. Pattison, 234 U.S. 399, 405 (1914). While Professor Beale states
that these two jurisdictions apply lex loci contractus unqualifiedly in chattel transfers, 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 993 (1935), the Iowa and South Dakota cases he cites-
Kusser, Holt and Griene, supra--do not seem to support his position.
125. The term lex loci conmnerciendi, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567, 577 (1957), denotes
the law of the principal place of business. The rule is adopted by the Uniform Commercial
Code, although qualified by a renvoi principle. For example, when litigation is initiated
in a Code state, § 9-103(2) requires courts to consult the laws, including the conflict of
laws rules, of the carrier's principal place of business. Though the reference to the con-
flicts rules-presumably lex situs-would at first seem to necessitate Code state filing, in
practice it will not have this effect. For § 9-103(2) relinquishes jurisdiction over carrier
property when the home state is elsewhere. Theoretically, then, there is a reference to the
home state whose conflicts rule refers back to the Code state (renvoi) which disclaims
jurisdiction and again refers to the home state and so on ad infinitum. In practice, the
Code's jurisdictional disclaimer and reference to the home state will cut off at that point
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Still, initial perfection is rarely sufficient, the major problems ensuing once
trucks move to other jurisdictions.1 27 Only one state, Maine, protects foreign
liens not refiled within its districts.1 28 Most courts refuse to uphold security
unless the home state refuses recordation. Only then will the Code state accept the refer-
ence back. See UNIFORS COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103, comment 6 (1957 draft).
The Code is now in force only in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Supp. 1957),
but has been enacted in two other jurisdictions, MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106 (effective Oct.
1, 1958) ; Kentucky (effective July 1, 1960) (no official citation; Code enactment reported
in 3 CCH CONDIT. SALE-CHAT. MORT. REP., Report Letter No. 359, April 8, 1958, p. 1).
To comply with § 9-103, carriers must file liens in each of these states when trucks operate
there.
Alternatively, § 9-103(4) allows perfection by noting liens on a controlling certificate
of title. For discussion of the titling system, see notes 137-41 infra and accompanying
text. The title provision, however, was not in the 1952 draft of the Code so Pennsylvania
does not recognize the title notation method of perfection. But see note 130 infra.
126. Thus, when a truck's situs, the carrier's principal place of business or domicile
and the place of contracting are located in different states, liens must be initially perfected
in each of these jurisdictions.
127. Courts do not generally invalidate locally unrecorded liens perfected in other
states unless the truck's transit through the foreign jurisdiction has some degree of
permanence. Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920) ; Yellow
Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Rogers, 235 Mo. App. 96, 142 S.W.2d 888 (1940) ; Hare & Chase,
Inc. v. Tomkinson, 129 Atl. 396 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1925). See also In re Bowman, 28 F.2d 620
(N.D.N.Y. 1928) (intrastate removal) ; Burke v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 Okla. 52, 168 P.2d
285 (1946) (same). However, trucks operating in interstate commerce engage in regular
transit through many states. Since courts have never defined the quantum of activities
constituting temporary or permanent transit, institutional lenders insist that liens be refiled
before or simultaneously with removal. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. This
practice often hinders normal carrier operations. For example, the Railway Express
Agency reports almost total inability to approve operating department requests for emer-
gency relocation of vehicles because of lien perfection complexities. Hearings, supra note
12, at 45-46.
One statute has attempted to define relocation for interstate carriers. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46-117 (Supp. 1956) provides that permanent use means more than three times a month.
In C.I.T. Corp. v. W. J. Crosby Co., 175 Va. 16, 7 S.E.2d 107 (1940), the court interpreted
the statute to require that every truck in a fleet register if combined fleet operations equal
or exceed the statutory total. This decision confirmed fears that regular carrier operations
would not be considered temporary and that blanket lien perfection was a practical neces-
sity.
128. Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Hamilton, 113 Me. 63, 92 Atl. 1001 (1915), followed
in Boscho, Inc. v. Knowles, 147 Me. 8, 83 A.2d 122 (1951) (conditional sales; see I re
Di Pierro, 159 F. Supp. 497, 499-500 (D. Me. 1958), indicating that chattel mortgage
law may be different). This doctrine will hereinafter be referred to as Rule I. Rule II
will denote the view that protects foreign recorded interests when the secured party
has not consented to removal, see note 129 infra, and Rule III the thesis that no locally
unrecorded interests will be perfected irrespective of consent, see note 130 infra. The
Connecticut legislature has enacted Rule I, effective July 1, 1959, limited to liens properly
perfected on a foreign motor vehicle certificate of title. Conn. Acts 1957, No. 607, § 21
(c) (2) (A). New Jersey may also follow Rule I for foreign chattel mortgages. While
no definitive state court decision exists, cf. Charles T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105
N.J.L. 470, 144 Atl. 617 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929), the federal court in RFC v. Weiner, 192
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1951), held consent irrelevant but recognized that New Jersey policy
is unclear. Unfortunately, financers cannot rely on a federal court decision but must per-
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interests perfected only in other states unless the lienor has not consented to
the removal.129 Several states invalidate locally unperfected foreign liens irre-
fect in New Jersey until local policy is declared by the state supreme court. Moreover,
Rule I is statutorily declared inapplicable to conditional sales contracts. See note 129 infra.
Commentators have stated that the rule obtains in other states but the authorities cited
either do not support the contention or have been subsequently overruled by decision or
statute. The leading articles include Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of
Laws, 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 345, 367 n.68 (1935) ; Lee, Conflict of Laws Relating to Install-
ment Sales, 41 MICH. L. REv. 445, 452 n.30 (1942) ; Leflar, Constitutional Jurisdiction
Over Tangible Chattels, 2 Mo. L. REv. 171, 179 n.40 (1937) ; Stumberg, Chattel Security
Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IowA L. REv. 528, 538 n.37 (1942) ; Note, 27
GEO. L.J. 968, 970 n.12 (1939). The states supposedly adhering to Rule I according to
their citations are Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Vermont, Wisconsin
and the federal courts. Maine and New Jersey have already been discussed. The Iowa and
Minnesota cases are dicta, both courts specifically noting the removal was without consent
and refusing to declare how they would decide in case of a consent removal. First Nat'l
Bank v. Ripley, 204 Iowa 590, 215 N.W. 647 (1927); Silver v. McDonald, 172 Minn.
458, 215 N.W. 844 (1927). In Minnesota, a subsequent decision followed Rule II. See
note 129 infra. Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (8th Cir. 1900), generally cited as the
leading case, is also dictum as was specifically recognized by one court which rejected its
authority. Moore v. Keystone Driller Co., 30 Idaho 220, 223, 163 Pac. 1114 (1917). The
decisions in Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma and Vermont have been overruled, see notes 129-30 infra, and the
viability of the Iowa and Wisconsin decisions is problematical. For the nineteenth-century
rule that interests created in one state were not divested by removal underlies the older
cases. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Freyer, 93 Ala. 257, 9 So. 285 (1891). This rule, devised
when chattels were relatively immovable, has declined as mobile equipment financing de-
veloped and increased opportunities for fraudulent relocation. Most courts have formulated
consent doctrines to foster an equitable balance between foreign and local interests. Unless
state courts have recently upheld locally unfiled liens after the lender's consent to removal,
as in Maine, the most realistic assumption is that such encumberances will not be protected.
129. Rule II. Tna UNiroRm CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 14 (hereinafter referred to
as UCSA) codifies Rule II with the modification that the vendor has ten days after learn-
ing of or consenting to the removal to refile and will be cited where applicable. States
adhering to the doctrine are:
Arizona: Aiuz. CODE ANN. § 52-611 (Supp. 1954) (UCSA); Ragner v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 66 Ariz. 157, 185 P.2d 525 (1947), overruling sub silentio earlier
adherence to Rule I announced in Davis v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 35 Ariz. 392, 278 Pac.
384 (1929).
Arkansas: Chetopa State Bank v. Manes, 221 Ark. 784, 255 S.W.2d 957 (1953).
California: Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190 (1928).
Colorado: Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930) (Rule II followed
only as to mortgages of nonmobile chattels). For the Colorado rule with respect to con-
ditional sales contracts and motor vehicle chattel mortgages, see note 130 infra.
Connecticut: General Credit Corp. v. Rohde, 122 Conn. 100, 187 Atl. 676 (.1936). This
rule will be changed, effective July 1, 1959, as to motor vehicles. Liens perfected on for-
eign certificates of title will be absolutely protected (Rule I) ; those not so perfected will
be locally enforced for four months. Conn. Acts 1957, No. 607, §§ 21(c) (2) (A), (B).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 914 (Supp. 1956) (UCSA); Morris Plan Bank
v. Terrell, 44 Del. 533, 62 A.2d 452 (1948) (chattel mortgages).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27 (Supp. 1957), Livingston v. National Shawmut
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Bank, 62 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1952), overruling the Rule III doctrine announced in Lee v. Bank,
159 Fla. 481, 32 So. 2d 7 (1947).
Idaho: Moore v. Keystone Driller Co., supra note 128.
Illinois: The Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925). The earlier
Rule III case of Judy v. Evans, 109 Il. App. 154 (1903), was overruled by Long.
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-814 (Supp. 1955) (UCSA) ; Manufacturers Acceptance
Corp. v. Shaver Motor Co., 120 Ind. App. 178, 89 N.E.2d 81 (1949) (chattel mortgages).
Kansas: Hess-Harrington, Inc. v. State Exchange Bank, 155 Kan. 118, 122 P.2d 739
(1942), overruling earlier adherence to Rule I announced in Handley v. Harris, 48 Kan.
606, 29 Pac. 1145 (1892),
Kentucky: Herold Motorcar Co. v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 335, 287 S.W. 939 (1926).
Kentucky recently adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, effective July 1, 1960. See
note 125 supra. For the probable Code effect on consent rules, see note 130 infra (,Mas-
sachusetts and Pennsylvania discussion).
Louisiana: Finance Security Co. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (conditional
sales) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 210, 196 So. 323 (1940), revers-
ing the former Rule III position on chattel mortgages.
Maryland: Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v. Faunkhauser, 65 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir.
1933) (applying Maryland law) ; cf. Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 163 Atl.
810 (1933).
Michigan: MicE. STAT. ANN. § 26.929(1) (Supp. 1957). Michigan was formerly a
Rule III state. Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N.W. 581 (1890). An attempt to
have Corbett overruled aborted when the Michigan court split evenly, Metro-Plan, Inc.
v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304 (1941), so legislative action re-
solved the problem.
M1,finnesota: Mason City Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn.
537, 286 N.W. 713 (1939). A Minnesota federal district court, however, apparently has
taken a Rule I position. Personal Finance Co. v. Le Cuyer (unreported decision; case
discussed in 7 PERs. F.L.Q. REP. 80 (1952)).
Missouri: Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
Montana: Walker Motor Exchange v. Lindberg, 86 Mont. 513, 284 Pac. 270 (1930).
Nebraska: Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N.W. 827
(1913).
Nevada: Southwest Cattle Loan Co. v. Nevada Packing Co., 53 Nev. 55, 292 Pac. 587
(1930).
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361:14 (Supp. 1957) (UCSA); National
Bank v. Vermont Packing Co., 90 N.H. 232, 6 A.2d 176 (1939), overruling sub silentio
earlier adherence to Rule I announced in Cleveland Machine Works v. Lang, 67 N.H.
348, 31. AtI. 20 (1892).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:32-19 (Supp. 1957) (UCSA). For the New Jersey
position on chattel mortgages, see note 128 supra.
New Mexico: Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N.M. 267, 21 P.2d 96
(1933). After partially overruling this decision, N.M. Laws 1947, c. 64, the New Mexico
legislature repealed their act, N.M. Laws 1953, c. 138, § 21(4).
New York: N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 73 (UCSA); see also Goetschius v. Brightman,
245 N.Y. 186, 156 N.E. 660 (1927) (leading case; conditional sales) ; Edgerly v. Bush,
81, N.Y. 199 (1880) (chattel mortgages).
North Carolina: Universal Finance Co. v. Clary, 227 N.C. 247, 41 S.E.2d 760 (1947).
North Dakota: Hansboro State Bank v. Imperial Elevator Co., 46 N.D. 363, 367-68,
179 N.W. 669, 670-71 (1920).
Ohio: Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134 (1857). But see note 130 infra.
South Carolina: Adams v. Fellers, 88 S.C. 212, 70 S.E. 722 (1911).
South Dakota: S.D. CODE § 54.0214 (Supp. 1.952) (UCSA); Emerson-Brantingham
Implement Co. v. Ainslie, 38 S.D. 472, 161 N.W. 1001 (1917) (chattel mortgages).
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spective of whether consent has been granted.130 In any event, since financers
in interstate carrier transactions inherently acquiesce to removal, refiling is
Tennessee: Hamblen Motor Co. v. Miller & Harle, 150 Tenn. 602, 266 S.W. 99 (1924).
Tennessee initially adopted Rule III, Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 79 S.W. 796 (1903),
but changed to Rule II shortly thereafter, Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S.W.
490 (1911).
Texas: Bank v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843. (1950), apparently overruling
former adherence to Rule III announced in Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111
Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921). But see TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNcIL, ANALYSIS OF
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 11 (1954) (Fretz case weakened, but did
not fully overrule, prior Texas adherence to Rule III).
Vermont: Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d 120 (1956), over-
ruling sub silentio prior adherence to Rule I announced in Barrett v. Kelly, 66 Vt. 515, 29
Atl. 809 (1894).
Washington: Roedecker v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4020 (1955) (UCSA). Chattel mortgages are
discussed in note 130 infra.
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 122.14 (1955) (UCSA). Chattel mortgages are dis-
cussed in note 130 infra.
WVyoming: Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13 Wyo. 358, 80 Pac. 151 (1905).
District of Columbia: Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp., 58
F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
Occasionally, a Rule II state will refuse to grant comity to the laws of a state follow-
ing Rule III. Compare Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925),
with Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 218 S.W.2d 75 (1949).
130. Rule III. The states in this group can be subdivided into two categories. The
first statutorily requires their courts to protect unrecorded foreign liens for a given period
of time after removal. Then, protection ceases until local recordation. Consent is not a
factor. These are:
Alabama: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 123 (Supp. 1955) (both chattel mortgages and
conditional sales protected for three months after removal).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 67-108 (1957), cf. Armitage-Herschell Co. v. Muscogee
Real Estate Co., 119 Ga. 552, 46 S.E. 634 (1904) (chattel mortgages protected for six
months) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1403 (1957), see Smith Motor Car Co. v. Universal Credit
Co., 176 Ga. 565, 168 S.E. 18 (1933) (conditional sale protected for thirty days).
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 106, § 9-103(3) (effective Oct. 1, 1958). This
statute adopts the Uniform Commercial Code which protects any unrecorded foreign lien
for four months. This rule is much more liberal than similar non-Code statutory rules
since it applies only to chattels which are not supposed to be removed; liens on equipment
such as a motor truck which is regularly used in interstate operations are absolutely pro-
tected in the Code state after filing at the principal place of business or on a controlling
certificate of title. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-103(2), (4) (1957 draft). If the
principal place of business disallows recordation, a reference to its conflicts rules-usually
lex situs-allows perfection in the Code state. See note 125 supra.
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 58 (Supp. 1957) (chattel mortgages protected
for 120 days after removal) ; id. tit. 60, § 318 (chattel mortgage rule applies to conditional
sales; see Arnold v. Wittie, 99 Okla. 236, 227 Pac. 132 (1924)).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-103(2), (3) (Supp. 1957). Pennsylvania
is a Uniform Commercial Code state. See remarks under Massachusetts supra. How-
ever, Pennsylvania adopted the 1952 draft of the Code which did not provide for title
certificate perfection. However, it will most likely amend its statute to conform to the
current draft. The Code overruled the Rule III doctrine announced in Kaufmann & Baer
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ordinarily necessary whenever trucks cross state lines. 131 Moreover, the refusal
of many states to recognize filing in advance of a truck's arrival requires
v. Monroe Motor Line Transp., Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 At. 296 (1936) (even record-
ing of foreign mortgage ineffective).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3996 (1955) (chattel mortgages protected for
thirty days). This statute overrules earlier adherence to Rule II, Cunningham v. Donel-
son, 110 W. Va. 331, 153 S.E. 705 (1931), as was specifically recognized by the state
supreme court in Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 120 W. Va. 420, 198 S.E. 875 (1938).
The second category consists of states which either judicially or statutorily refuse to
protect foreign liens until they have been locally perfected. These are:
Colorado: Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921) (conditional sales;
partially overruled in an unreported decision. See Comment, 25 RocIy MT. L. RLv. 60
(1952)) ; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-32 (Supp. 1957) (limited to motor vehicle chat-
tel mortgages not perfected on a title certificate). For rule on nonmobile chattels, see note
129 supra.
Mississippi: Miss. Cona ANN. § 870 (1956), Patterson v. Universal Credit Corp., 204
Miss. 268, 37 So. 2d 306 (1948).
Ohio: The Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951) (limited
to protecting local purchasers relying on a "clear" Ohio certificate of title). See Gibson
v. Bolner, 165 Ohio St. 357, 135 N.E.2d 353 (1956) ; see also note 129 supra.
Virginia: VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-99 (Supp. 1956). Virginia originally followed Rule I.
Craig v. Williams, 90 Va. 500, 18 S.E. 899 (1894). Then the statute, refusing 'Protection
until recordation, was drafted to cover "mortgages, deeds of trust or other encumberances."
Presumably, the legislature intended to encompass conditional sales but a lower Virginia
court ruled the statute inapplicable to these encumberances and pro tanto adopted Rule II.
Osmond-Barringer Co. v. Hey, 7 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 175 (Rich. Ct. L. & Eq. 1921). The
state supreme court has avoided the question by holding that temporary use of a condition-
ally sold truck in Virginia did not constitute removal. C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195
S.E. 659 (1938). Constitutional attacks on the statute have been rejected. W. H. Apple-
white Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N.C. 433, 187 S.E. 588 (1936).
Five state courts are still uncommitted to a removal rule:
Iowa: Cf. Northern Finance Co. v. Meinhardt, 209 Iowa 895, 226 N.W. 168 (1929);
First Nat'l Bank v. Ripley, 204 Iowa 590, 593, 215 N.W. 647, 649 (1927).
Oregon: Cf. Keegan v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 1.94, 206-10, 135 P.2d 717, 722-23 (1943) ; Eli
Bridge Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac. 435 (1928).
Rhode Island: Cf. Ramunno v. Waterman Avenue Bakery, Inc., 78 R.I. 193, 80 A.2d
426 (1951) ; Goldstein v. Mack Motor Truck Co., 56 R.I. 1, 183 Atl. 136 (1936).
Utah: No case in point.
Wisconsin: For conditional sales rule, see note 129 supra. Cf. Smith v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 267 (1868) (chattel mortgages).
131. Even if a lender contends he did not acquiesce to the removal, he will be bound.
Knowledge that interstate carriage is contemplated is equivalent to consent. Robbins v.
Bostian, 138 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1943) ; United Constr. Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670 (6th
Cir. 1942).
,Formulated to meet problems arising from interstate automobile movements, the ma-
jority Rule II effectively balances competing interests in car removal cases. But consider-
ing the situational realities involved in multistate trucking, courts would be well advised
to apply Rule I to interstate carrier fleets. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
See also GOoDRICH, CONFLICt OF LAWs 483, 486, 488 (3d ed. 1949) (proposing that con-
sent never be considered a factor in chattel removal cases). A few courts have sporadically
circumvented the consent element by refusing to find removal sufficiently permanent to
necessitate refiling. See P. R. Smith Motor Sales Inc. v. Lay, 173 Va. 117, 3 S.E.2d 190
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elaborate arrangements for recording as vehicles enter various jurisdictions.1 3 2
For a scheduled truck line, multiple and staggered recordation is possible
though extremely burdensome.133 Nonscheduled carriers, lacking an assigned
route, find these machinations too impracticable to attempt. 3 4 Finally, both
multiple filing and timing problems are significantly compounded in states
which require county by county 135 instead of unitary recordation.13 6
(1939) ; cases cited note 127 supra. But since these cases did not involve vehicles engaged in
regular transit through the state, they offer little comfort to interstate carriers. Moreover,
the judicial trend is toward Rule III. Courts, straining to protect local bona fide pur-
chasers and creditors from the "skip-state" purchase racket in automobiles, have resorted
to many devices to avoid application of the consent dichotomy. For example, buying a car
on credit in one state, the skip-state purchaser drives to another, obtains a "clear" certifi-
cate of title and resells. If Rule II were followed, the initial seller, not having consented
to the removal, would prevail. Under Rule III, the thief's nonconsent removal would
operate in favor of the local buyer. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 997-98 (1.935). See also
Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Autonobiles, 96 U. PA. L. Rv. 455
(1948), wherein the author cites and discusses a series of 1947 cases in which the consent
rules were circumvented on technicalities. Since then, a number of cases have arisen which
support Mr. Leary's thesis. See, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Neal, 145 F. Supp. 677
(N.D. Fla. 1956) ; Atha v. Bockius, 39 Cal. 2d 635, 248 P.2d 745 (1952) ; Seale Motor Co.
v. Stone, 218 S.C. 373, 62 S.E.2d 824 (1950). And in one case, the court simply over-
ruled its earlier adherence to Rule II, The Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99
N.E.2d 665 (1951), limiting its decision to motor vehicles, see Gibson v. Bolner, 165 Ohio
St. 357, 135 N.E.2d 353 (1956). See also Lee v. Bank, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So. 2d 7 (1947),
discussed in note 129 supra. Unfortunately, judicial attempts to control interstate auto-
mobile frauds have shifted emphasis to the harshest possible rule and thus redound un-
favorably to the trucking industry.
132. Hearings, supra note 12, at 49; see also Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions
and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IOWA L. REv. 528, 546 (1942); WAHMANN, TRucc Com-
PANT FINANCING 80 (unpublished thesis 1946). One state even refuses to recognize recor-
dation of liens encumbering chattels frequently, though not continuously, located in the
jurisdiction. In Vervaris v. Egan, 226 Ill. App. 500 (1922), the court accorded a local
attaching creditor priority over a previously recorded chattel mortgage. The basis of the
decision was that the truck had acquired sufficient situs to be attached but not enough to
validate local recordation. See also Kaufmann & Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transp.,
Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 Atl. 296 (1936) (Pennsylvania's policy against recording for-
eign chattel mortgages extends to foreign liens; local perfection not permitted). This
decision has been overruled by Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (Supp. 1.957).
133. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EN-
LARGED EDITORIAL BOARD FOR AMENDMENT OF TEXT AND ANSWERS TO CERTAIN CRITICISMS
180-81. (1955).
134. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103, comment 3 (1952 draft).
135. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 74; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.04.090
(1957) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 59-109 (Supp. 1957). Moreover, in many states the
law is unclear whether county by county recordation is required, WAHmANN, TRUCK
COMPANY FINANCING 80 (unpublished thesis 1946), thereby forcing additional filings.
136. Smith v. Simmons, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E. 312 (1926) ; Bailey v. Godfrey, 54
Ill. 507 (1870) ; Hauseman Motor Co. v. Napierella, 223 Ky. 433, 3 S.W.2d 1084 (1928).
Even this system, however, engenders confusion. For while chattel mortgages need only
be filed at one place in the state, that location will often differ from the one designated
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The mechanics of filing combine with complex and diverse recording pre-
requisities to make multistate lien perfection virtually impossible. In most
jurisdictions, ordinary filing requirements have been supplemented or replaced
by motor vehicle certificate of title laws.13 7 Twenty-one states, the District of
Columbia and Alaska have eliminated recordation and substituted title certifi-
cate notation as the exclusive means of perfecting security interests in motor
vehicles.' 3 8 Semi-exclusive statutes in seven states require both filing and title
notation.' 39 In seven other jurisdictions, title notation, though permitted, does
for recording conditionai sales or equipment leases. See Gilmore, The Secured Trans-
actions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 32 (1951).
137. See Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16 LAW & CONTEUP.
PROB. 197 (1951). For Code treatment of title certificates, see UNIFORM COMMERcIALL
CODE §§ 9-302(3), (4) (1957 draft) ; id. § 9-302(2) and comments thereto (1952 draft).
138. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 66-231(f) (Supp. 1954); Arx. STAT. ANN. § 75-161(b)
(1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 198; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-19 (Supp. 1957);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2335 (Supp. 1956) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.15 (1958); IDAHo
CODE ANN. § 49-414 (1957); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.50 (Supp. 1957); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 32-710 (Supp. 1957); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 53-110(b) (Supp. 1957); NEB.
R1v. STAT. ANN. § 60-110 (1952); NEV. REv. STAT. § 482.450 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-5-2(b) (1953); OHIO ZEv. CODE ANN. § 4505.13 (Page Supp. 1957); ORE. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86-390(3) (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 33(b) (Supp. 1957); S.D.
CODE § 44.0203(1) (Supp. 1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-327(b) (Supp. 1957); TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 44 (Supp. 1957) (statute ambiguous but interpreted as
exclusive in Commercial Credit Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 155 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1941)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-87 (Supp. 1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 46-71 (Supp.
1956) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-702 (Stipp. 1957) ; Alaska Sess. Laws 1951, c. 124, § 7(6).
Pennsylvania is included although the statutory provision is ambiguous. In Kaufmann &
Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Transp., Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 Atl. 296 (1-936), the
court refused to recognize title perfection as valid. This decision was sharply criticized
but followed in Taplinger v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1938). Then,
Commercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co., 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d 616 (1938),
apparently overruled Kaufmann & Baer. See In re Berlin, 147 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1945);
ln re Miller, 107 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1952), both recognizing exclusive title perfec-
tion as valid on the strength of Comnercial Banking Corp. Contra, In re Bair, 49 F.
Supp. 56 (M.D. Pa. 1943), adhering to Kaufnann & Baer. The Pennsylvania supreme
court has not yet ruled on the question.
Geographically, the statutes are concentrated in the West and Southwest, where truck
traffic is relatively light. Of the commercially important eastern states, only Ohio and
probably Pennsylvania have exclusive statutes.
139. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135(c) (2) (Supp. 1957), General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181 (1950) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1497 (Supp.
1957), Nelson v. Viergiver, 230 Mich. 38, 42, 203 N.W. 164, 165 (1925) ; M o. ANN. STAT.
§ 443.480 (Supp. 1957), Kansas City Automobile Auction Co. v. Overall, 241 Mo. App.
280, 238 S.W.2d 446 (1951) (applies to nonpurchase money security interests only; see
note 140 infra) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-11(c) (Supp. 1957) ; N.D. Laws 1957, No. 161
(mortgagee may retain possession of certificate in lieu of title notation); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.12.030(2), 46.12.050, 46.12.170 (1957), Merchants Rating & Adjustment
Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940) ; Wyo. Comip. STAT. ANN. § 60-208(f)
(Supp. 1.957) (Nonpurchase money security interests must be recorded and notated con-
currently through depositing security instruments with the county clerk. Purchase money




not constitute perfection.140 Within each of these categories, moreover, marked
variances in notation prerequisites exist.141 Lien perfection aside, certification
is required by all title states as a condition of registration.142 While the cost
of titling is nominal,143 the concomitant registration fees and highway use taxes
prerequisite to local operation are substantial. 44 In the interest of equitable
distribution of revenues, a "gentlemens agreement" among states permits car-
riers to allocate vehicles for certification so that each interstate truck need only
140. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-2501, 51-501(k) (Supp. 1955) (chattel mortgages spe-
cifically included under regular recording act; see Note, 25 IND. L.J. 337 (1950)); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66%, § 28(c) (1957), In re Rosen, 23 F.2d 687 (D. Md. 1928); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-57 (Supp. 1957), Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co.,
190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 23.3 (Supp. 1957), King-
Godfrey, Inc. v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P.2d 935 (1932); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1721
(130) (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 85.01 (3) (a) (1955), Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Schneider, 265 Wis. 264, 61, N.W.2d 499 (1953).
Whether Georgia should be classified as a certificate of title or simply a registration
state is debatable. The statute, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 68-206 to -208 (1957), provides for a
certificate of title to act as indicia of both title and registration. In all other states, regis-
tration functions are discharged through licensing not certification. The Georgia certifi-
cate is not delivered to the secured party as it is in many states. Moreover, Georgia is the
only state requiring annual renewal of the certificate.
In the remaining thirteen states-Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South
Carolina and Vermont-and Hawaii, chattel mortgage and conditional sales recording
statutes still apply. Missouri and Wyoming, not listed above, should also be included in
this category with respect to purchase money security interests. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.480
(Supp. 1957) specifically excludes purchase money chattel mortgages from title notation
provisions. Id. § 428.100 provides that conditional sales contracts must be filed as chattel
mortgages. See Butler County Finance Co. v. Prince, 231 S.W.2d 834 ('Mo. Ct. App.
1950) (local filing only method of perfecting vehicle purchase money security interests).
The Wyoming act is unclear, but a state periodical reports that local practice is recorda-
tion only. See note 139 .nepra.
Connecticut will become an exclusive title state on July 1, 1959. Conn. Acts 1957, No.
607, §§ 21(a), 48.
Illinois until recently was a nonexclusive title state but its act has just been repealed.
Ill. Laws 1957, No. 802 (effective Jan. 1, 1959).
141. REGULAR COMMON CARRIER CONFERENCE OF THE AMFRICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIA-
TIONS, INC., FINANCING THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY 41 (1952); Richter, A Uniform
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Titid Law-A New Attempt, Bus. Law., July 1953, pp. 6, 8.
Consequently, financers still follow their pre title law practice of obtaining opinions by
local counsel before lending against a multistate truck fleet. See note 121 supra.
142. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2301 (Supp. 1956) ; MD. ANN. CODE art.
66%, § 24(a) (1957) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.12.020 (1957).
143. See, e.g., ARE. STAT. ANN. § 75-183 (Supp. 1957) (500 for issuing titles; same
for noting liens) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:728 (Supp. 1957) ($1.00 for issuing titles;
same for noting liens) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:10-11(A), (C) (Supp. 1957) ($1.50 for
issuance; $2.00 for notation).
144. See TAFF, op. cit. supra note 118, at 566-67; see also Capitol Greyhound Lines
v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 562 (1950) (summary of Supreme Court litigation involving state-
imposed taxes on interstate motor carriers).
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be titled in one jurisdiction.145 Yet no complimentary agreement exists for
recognition of liens noted on certificates issued by a foreign state. And while
retitling would be exorbitantly expensive, filing may not be sufficient to safe-
guard encumbrances in semi-exclusive states nor be possible in exclusive title
jurisdictions. 46 In the twenty-seven states in which recordation is still indis-
pensable, filing laws drafted to govern local encumbrancing of relatively im-
movable chattels thwart the needs of a highly mobile industry. 147 Some statutes
antedate the invention of the automobile ;148 all contain involved and divergent
recording requirements. For example, most states demand that security instru-
145. Letter from Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., Member of the Massachusetts Bar and
Chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on the Proposed Uniform Connmer-
cial Code, to Professor Grant Gilmore, Nov. 12, 1957, copy on file in Yale Law Library
(based on a limited sampling of carrier practices). The reciprocity arrangements usually
allocate registrations according to a proportional approximation of average annual miles
hauled in each state by a carrier to total average annual mileage. Since states do not title
vehicles unless they are registered in the jurisdiction, title splitting is a necessary concom-
itant of the reciprocity agreement. Letter from Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., supra; see TAFF,
op. cit. supra note 118, at 571 (reporting that twenty-six states authorize their officials to
enter into any form of reciprocity agreement, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 321.56(2) (Supp.
1957), and that in most other states circumscribed authority exists).
146. That the question is unresolved is disclosed by several commentators, Leary,
supra note 131, at 474; WAHMANN, TRUCK CO-MPANY FINANCING 75 (unpublished thesis
1946), and answers to inquiries sent to interested parties, letter from J. B. Wahmann to the
Yale Law Journal, April 21, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library; letter from Homer Kripke,
General Counsel for CIT Credit Corp., to the Yale Law Journal, April 7, 1958, on file in
Yale Law Library. Only one state, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27(3) (b) (1958), has a
definite provision allowing filing of foreign liens with the Motor Vehicle Commissioner.
Other exclusive title statutes usually provide that notation shall be the only means of per-
fecting a security instrument on a vehicle registered under the state's laws. See, e.g., CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 198. While this language can be construed as requiring notation of en-
cumbrances only for trucks registered and titled in the state, two courts have held that
recordation is insufficient, retitling and notation mandatory. In C.I.T. Corp. v. W. J. Crosby
& Co., 175 Va. 16, 7 S.E.2d 107 (1940), the court ruled that an entire fleet must reregister
and retitle in Virginia if any combination of trucks operates there more than three times
a month. And in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Vogt, 86 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Neb. 1957),
the court held that notation on a local title certificate was the exclusive method of perfect-
ing a lien even though the truck was not registered by the state.
The UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT § 20(c)
indicates a possible solution. Under this act, liens on any equipment used in interstate
transportation are locally valid if perfected on a foreign title certificate. Unfortunately,
no comparable provision exists in any existing title statute, and the Uniform Act has been
enacted in only one state, Connecticut, effective July 1, 1959. Conn. Acts 1957, No. 607.
147. "Chattel mortgage law and conditional sales law are what they are, not because
any one in his right mind ever thought that such a body of law made sense, but as a result
of a long process of tinkering to make late-medieval legal forms workable in an indus-
trialized society." Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 775 (1948).
148. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-1001 to -1009 (Supp. 1957) (basic sections en-
acted between 1875 and 1893) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 556.1-.28 (Supp. 1957) (derived from
an 1851 statute) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 511.01-.32 (Supp. 1957) (basic sections derived
from an 1897 act). See, generally, Leary, supra note 131.
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ments be acknowledged, the requirements varying sharply ;149 in a few, verifi-
cation, notarization or attestation is added or substituted.150 Accompanying
good faith or value affidavits, unnecessary in some jurisdictions,' 51 are exacted
in many. 15 2 Compliance with such varied requirements would be difficult
enough if allowed before trucks entered each jurisdiction. But when financing
parties are forced to attempt on-route perfection, errors are, for all practical
purposes, unavoidable. 1' 3
Truck liens unperfected in any on-route jurisdictions are not only invalid
in those states but may be avoidable in bankruptcy. Failure to observe the
filing or notation prerequisites of a state in which encumbered vehicles operate
permits attaching creditors to apply trucks to their own claims. 54 Should the
trucker go into bankruptcy, in which event the validity of security interests
becomes crucial, section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee title
to all property "upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a
lien . .. at the date of bankruptcy ... whether or not such a creditor actually
exists.' u '5 Accordingly, the mere presence of a vehicle in a jurisdiction whose
perfection requirements have not been satisfied when a bankruptcy petition is
filed would cause invalidation of the instrument. What may be a small risk
for an individual truck lien is significantly enhanced when entire fleets are
mortgaged. Use of one instrument, moreover, might magnify the effects of
149. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95, § 2 (Supp. 1.957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 857
(1957); Omz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.320 (1957). Acknowledgment requirements and rel-
evant cases are collected in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1124 (1952).
150. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-1-1 (Supp. 1957). Some states have wisely repealed
these formalities. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 178, § 1. (Supp. 1957). For cases in which
minor deviations from formal requirements have caused invalidation of liens, see Noyes
v. Bank, 206 Cal. 266, 274 Pac. 68 (1929) (acknowledgment) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Baker,
62 Ill. App. 154 (1896) (same) ; Cunningham v. Cureton, 96 Ga. 489, 23 S.E. 420 (1895)
(attestation); Consumers Credit Co. v. Manifold, 65 Idaho 238, 142 P.2d 150 (1943)
(notarization).
151. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-508 (Supp. 1955); Utah Laws, 1945, c. 18, § 1 (now
UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-1-1 (Supp. 1957)), amending UTAH CODE ANN. §. 13-0-1(2)
(1943).
152. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 30 (1957); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.929 (Supp.
1957); WASH. REV. CODE 'ANN. § 61.04.020 (1957).
153. See notes 131-36 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, most jurisdictions
impose lien refiling requirements, adding greatly to the chance of error. For a complete
summary of all state lien refiling requirements, see 1 & 2 CCH CONDIT. SALE-CHAT. MORT.
REP. (all states) 1f 180 (conditional sales), 1 480 (chattel mortgages). In addition, some
states prescribe a definite period beyond which liens are unenforceable against third parties.
S. REP. No. 553, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). Presumably, mortgages must be re-
executed as well as refiled in these jurisdictions.
154. If all requirements are not met, the instrument is deemed unrecorded. Consumers
Credit Co. v. Manifold, 65 Idaho 238, 142 P.2d 150 (1943) ; People v. Burns, 161 Mich.
169, 125 N.W. 740 (1910). And if it is unrecorded, attaching creditors prevail. Elk Creek
Lumber Co. v. Hamby, 84 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1936) ; Berlein v. Eddy, 89 Fla. 484,
487, 104 So. 780, 781 (1925); Peter Schuttler Co. v. Gunther, 222 Mich. 430, 435, 192
N.W. 661, 663 (1923).
155. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 1.1 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952).
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bankruptcy invalidation. To avoid the necessity of refiling liens in the same
state every time different trucks enter, a single document is frequently em-
ployed.156 However, a fleet mortgage invalid as to one truck when bankruptcy
ensues might be entirely voidable under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay.0 7 In
Bay, a mortgage on several chattels securing a $10,000 obligation was mis-
takenly filed in the wrong county. Before the error was corrected, the mort-
gagor incurred several minor debts. Under the local law, the mortgage would
have been void as against these creditors but valid against obligations of the
bankrupt arising after filing in the proper county.' 53 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court, relying on principles applicable to section 70(c), held that the trustee
in bankruptcy could avoid the whole mortgage and distribute the property it
secured to general creditors.159 Arguably, the instant problem is distinguish-
able from Bay in that trucks located in protected states are not reachable by
creditors, real or hypothetical, residing in vulnerable jurisdictions. On the
other hand, since the creditors in Bay could not reach the full amount of col-
lateral eventually freed by the Court, the case seems sufficiently analogous to
make fleet security of doubtful validity in bankruptcy when the filing demands
of an on-route state have not been met.
Even if perfection requirements are everywhere observed, liens may be
similarly invalidated when filing is delayed. Statutes in at least eight states
permit a gap creditor-one acquiring a claim between the execution and per-
156. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
157. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
158. Compare Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac. 911 (1899), with United
Bank & Trust Co. v. Powers, 89 Cal. AIp. 690, 265 Pac. 403 (1928).
159. Thus, if a $100,000 mortgage is superior to all interests except a $100 claim, the
security interest is set aside for the claims of unsecured creditors which, but for bank-
ruptcy, would be subordinate. Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1952) ; 4 COL-
LIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 70.95 (14th ed. 1942). The Bay decision provoked harsh criticism,
Scott, The Meaning of the Provisions for Recordation of a Transfer as Applicable to
Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act and a Critique of the Decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Case of Moore v. Bay, 18 VA. L. REv. 249, 265-69 (1932), and
equally vigorous defense, Note, 9 A s. BANXR. Rxv. 23 (1932). See also Schwartz, Moore
vs. Bay-Should Its Rule Be Abolished?, 60 Com. L.J. 67 (1955). It was widely noted.
See MooRE & COUNTRYMAN, DEBTORS' AND CorEITORS' RIGHTS 888 n.1 (1951) (collecting
citations).
The bankruptcy courts have enthusiastically enforced the doctrine. See cases collected
in 4 CoLLIER, op. cit. satpra. They have generally been unsympathetic to assertions that
application of Bay is inequitable. See, e.g., Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., 104
F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1939) (the lender is'at fault if the lien is imperfect; therefore he
has no cause for complaint). Moreover, there is the "part-bad, all-bad" doctrine of Brown
v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926), in which the court held that a mortgage on chattels
and realty is totally void if the chattel lien alone is invalid. Brown was applied to a multi-
chattel transaction in Arbury v. Kocher, 18 F.2d 588 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). Though decided
as an extension of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (for discussion see notes 76-
78, 80, 84-87 supra and accompanying text), Brown has not been cited in recent decisions
in that area. However, it could be revivified in the Benedict context or used as an ex-




fection of a security interest-to defeat that interest, even after its perfection,
by obtaining a judicial lien.' 00 Under the rule of Constance v. Harvey, section
70(c) arms the trustee in bankruptcy with the rights of a hypothetical gap
creditor. 161 In the context of truck financing, the critical gap occurs between
a vehicle's arrival in a Constance state and perfection within that jurisdic-
tion.Y62 Located in all areas of the country, states in which Constance is oper-
160. The cases so holding are:
California: Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac. 911 (1899), applied in National
Bank v. Moore, 247 Fed. 913 (9th Cir. 1918) (bankruptcy).
Maine: Production Credit Ass'n v. Kent, 143 Me. 145, 56 A.2d 631 (1948); see ln re
Di Pierro, 159 F. Supp. 497, 499-500 (D. Me. 1958) (chattel mortgage only; not con-
ditional sale).
Maryland: Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 118 AUt. 198 (1.922), applied
in Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., supra note 159 (bankruptcy) (state case am-
biguous; federal case clear).
Mfichigan: Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N.W. 128 (1935), applied
in In re Cotter, 113 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Mich. 1953) (bankruptcy).
Missouri: Pearson v. Lafferty, 197 Mo. App. 123, 193 S.W. 40 (1917), applied in Mer-
cantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953) (bankruptcy).
Ncw York: Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893), applied in Constance v.
Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954) (bankruptcy) (chattel mortgage only; not con-
ditional sale).
North Dakota: Union Nat'l Bank v. Oium, 3 N.D. 193, 200-01, 54 N.W. 1034, 1036
(1892), followed, Lakota Mercantile Co. v. Balsley, 60 N.D. 768, 236 N.W. 631 (1931).
South Dakota: Hollenbeck v. Louden, 35 S.D. 320, 152 N.W. 116 (1915).
In Barber v. Reina Nash Motor Co., 72 Wyo. 65, 81, 260 P.2d 928, 933 (1953), the court
cited cases from two additional jurisdictions, Kentucky and Wisconsin, as following this
delay-in-perfection doctrine. The Kentucky case, Wicks Bros. v. McConnell, 102 Ky. 434,
43 S.W. 205 (1897), is apparently no longer followed in that state. A 1916 amendment
to the Kentucky statutes, now Ky. RE,. STAT. ANN. § 382.270 (1955), was interpreted by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals to preclude such a result, Smith v. Holland, 298 Ky. 598,
607, 183 S.W.2d 647, 651, (1944). The Wisconsin case, Sanger v. Guenther, 73 Wis. 354,
41 N.W. 436 (1889), does not rest on delayed filing but fraud. The holding is apparently
limited to cases in which the mortgagee fraudulently delays filing at the mortgagor's re-
quest. Then, subsequent filing does not defeat previously accrued rights of gap creditors.
No Wisconsin case exists defining whether the same rule applies to innocently delayed
recordations.
161. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954). The Second Circuit has reaffirmed its stand, Conti
v. Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956) ; and Constance has been followed by the Ninth
Circuit, England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956). Contra, In re Di Pierro,
supra note 160, at 498-99 n.2 (criticizing Constance). For a discussion of Constance, see
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402, 412-13 n.37 (1958). See also National Bankruptcy Conference,
Summary of Proceedings, 1956 Annual Meeting, Resolution No. 36 (condemning Col-
stance and suggesting legislative revision) ; Seligson, Annual Survey of American Law,
Bankruptcy, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 558, 559-62 (1955) (criticizing Constance); Seligson,
Creditors' Rights, 32 N.Y.U.L. RE;v. 708, 722-23 (1957) (same).
162. Of the eight Constance states, seven follow Rule II on protection of liens after
collateral removal. See note 129 supra. Since consent is inherent in interstate truck financ-
ing, see note 131 supra, perfection will be necessary in these jurisdictions. The eighth
Coitstance state, Maine, follows Rule I. See note 128 supra. To the extent that Maine so
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ative are likely to be on-route for most interstate vehicles.' 63 And gaps seem
inevitable since mortgages cannot be filed before a truck's arrival. 1 4 More
important, the likelihood that one vehicle will be situated in a Constance state
when a bankruptcy petition is filed combines with the doctrine of Moore v.
Bay to threaten the validity of an entire fleet obligation.165
The obvious inability of interstate truck lines to offer unimpeachable security
has impelled interested parties to seek congressional action. Proposed legis-
lation has followed two patterns: central recordation with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission 166 and nationally effective perfection through compliance
with the laws of the state in which a carrier principally conducts business.
137
Although truckers favor central recording,168 ICC opposition has forced them
to promote the state perfection solution. 169 The most recent bill adopting this
approach, S. 375, has obtained Senate approval and will soon be considered
by the House. 1'70 Its ultimate enactment would undoubtedly aid truck financ-
ing. Yet the bill, and the- approach, seem defective.
protects security interests in removed trucks, application of Constance would seem to depend
on whether the truck was regularly operated in, rather than removed to, the state. However,
Maine may distinguish between chattel mortgages and conditional sales for purposes of
Rule I protection. Compare Production Credit Ass'n v. Kent, 143 Me. 145, 56 A.2d 631
(1948), wtith Boscho, Inc. v. Knowles, 147 Me. 8, 83 A.2d 122 (1951) ; see In re Di Pierro,
159 F. Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1958).
163. See note 160 supra.
164. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 157-59 supra and accompanying text.
Under another interpretation of Constance, entire fleet obligations will be jeopardized
when a truck has at any time been in a Constance state. According to that interpretation,
§ 70(c) gives the trustee the rights of a hypothetical creditor who obtained a lien, instead
of merely extending credit, between execution and perfection of a security interest. See
MoORE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 656 n.3 (1955). Hypothetically, then, a creditor
could have attached a vehicle whenever it was present, but not promptly recorded, in a
Constance state. His subsequent hypothetical transformation of that attachment into a
judgment lien could conceivably meet § 70(c)'s requirement of obtaining a lien at the date
of bankruptcy. Application of Moore v. Bay would then avoid the entire fleet mortgage.
166. S. 768, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 711, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S.
2031, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). None were reported out of committee. A copy of S.
2031 is reprinted in Hearings, supra note 12, at 4-5.
167. S. 3185, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), reported out of committee, S. REP. No.
1461, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) ; S. 1966, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reported out of
committee, S. REP. No. 553, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. 375, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), reported out of committee, S. REP. No. 701, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). For a
full discussion and text of S. 375, see notes 170-88 infra and arco;npanying text.
168. S. REP. No. 701, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957) ; Hearings, supra note 12, at 45,
48, 52-53, 58.
169. Id. at 30, 54, 55.
170. 103 CONG. REc. 12327-28 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1957), referred to the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 103 CONG. REc. 12554 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1957). The bill provides:
"(a) As used in this section the term 'purchaser' means any mortgagor, lessee, bailee,
buyer, or person holding a motor vehicle under a title retaining contract, mortgage,
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Defects in Proposed Legislation
S. 375 fails to take full cognizance of present title certificate systems and,
indeed, truck operations. 171 The recent state trend toward certificates of title
laws can, to a large extent, be ascribed 'to a reappraisal of recording func-
tions.'1 2 Filing requirements are traditionally justified as a means of protect-
ing creditors who may see chattels in a debtor's possession and rely on them
for ultimate satisfaction or actually demand them as security. 73 Rather than
conduct burdensome and often costly record searches, however, both trade and
institutional creditors typically depend on their own evaluation of a debtor's
honesty and continued solvency. 174 Complementing this practice, the notation
lease agreement, bailment, trust indenture, or other instrument having the effect
thereof.
"(b) Any mortgage, lease, equipment trust agreement, conditional sale agreement,
or other instrument evidencing the lease, conditional sale, or bailment of one or more
motor vehicles owned by, or the use and possession of which has by such instrument
been transferred to, a motor, rail, e.press, or water carrier subject to any provision
of this Act [Interstate Commerce Act] shall be valid and enforcible without filing or
recording in any State against any person to the same extent that such instrument
would be enforcible against such person if the filing and recording statutes of such
State, if any, applicable to such documents had been complied with, if
"(1) such instrument has been recorded or filed in the State in which the purchaser
resides, or if a corporation or other business legal entity has its principal place of
business, and/or
"(2) such instrument is valid or enforcible against creditors of the purchaser and
against subsequent purchasers from the first purchaser named in such instrument
in the State in which the purchaser resides, or if a corporation or other business
legal entity has its principal place of business."
Both of S. 375's predecessors, see note 167 supra, obtained Senate approval but were never
reported out of committee in the House, Hearings, supra note 12, at 50, apparently be-
cause the House, like the trucking industry, favors central recording, id. at 56. See also
101 CONG. REc. 8634 (1955); 100 CONG. REc. 7384 (1954).
171. See notes 137-40 supra and accompanying text.
172. Leary, Horse and Buggy Lie); Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L.
REv. 455, 458-61 (1948) ; Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 197, 201-04 (1951).
173. See In re Noel, 137 Fed. 694, 701 (D. Md. 1905) ("The object of the recording
of conveyances is to prevent the hardship resulting to creditors and purchasers from the
existence of secret conveyances, not disclosed by the public records, of property of which
the grantor remains the ostensible owner"). See also Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch,
58 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1932) ; it re Bennett, 264 Fed. 533 (W.D. Mo. 1920) (collecting
authorities).
174. See Barrett v. Bank of the Manhattan Co., 218 F.2d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1954)
("it is most improbable that a third person dealing with the buyer would think it impor-
tant to consult the records . . . ."). See also Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation,
31 COLUM. L. Rzv. 617, 633-34 (1931) ; Koessler, Assignments of Accounts Receivable,
33 CAuiF. L. Rxv. 40, 41 (1945). But see testimony of representative of unsecured cred-
itors arguing that filing of chattel mortgages is desirable to prevent credit extensions on
strength of apparent ownership. NEW YORK LAw REvisbox CommissiO , AsSIGNMENTS
OF AccouNTs REcEIvABI 258-59 (1946).
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requirement of title certificate laws permits easy determination of a debtor's
interest in motor vehicles.' 75 Certificates are either carried by vehicles or in
the possession of financing parties. Creditors are, therefore, warned of lien
existence by the certificate itself or the trucker's inability to produce it. To
encourage reliance on a title's information, states generally refuse to grant
certificates unless owners avouch that their vehicles are not titled in another
jurisdiction. 176 An obvious weakness of the system is that double titling can
still be secured by dishonest applicants with a view toward financing two loans
on the same vehicle. S. 375, though recognizing only those liens perfected in
a carrier's home state, may increase this possibility. Approximately half the
interstate trucks in operation are certificated in jurisdictions other than the
principal place of business.11 7 To this extent, compliance with S. 375 would
necessitate retitling in home states. Since retitling would require reregistra-
tion, one objective of S. 375-elimination of high perfection costs-would be
frustrated.178 Moreover, the existence of other certificates, in fact useless for
perfection or disclosure purposes, might prove deceptive to a trucker's cred-
itors. And insolvent debtors, now possibly restrained by the expense or in-
convenience of purchasing second titles, may be more tempted to double financ-
ing, once forced to possess two certificates.
Alternatively, retitling might not be allowed, nor recording be sufficient, in
exclusive or semi-exclusive jurisdictions. 7 9 Honest truckers located in these
states but registered in others would then be unable to offer security.'80 Recog-
nizing that S. 375 had combined with interstate compacts to create an im-
possible situation, courts might hold that truck liens noted on other state's titles
could be perfected in title certificate home states by recordation with ordinary
chattel mortgages. Even this view, however, would offer only a partial solu-
tion. Liens cannot be filed in most states unless the vehicle is engaged in
175. Reliance on title certificates issued by exclusive or semi-exclusive jurisdictions is
standard commercial practice. Memorandum From Walter Malcolm, Esq. and Robert Hay-
dock, Jr., Esq. to the Members of the American Law Institute Subcommittee on Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code, August 16, 1957, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
176. Letter from Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., supra note 145. If retitling is allowed, the
usual requirement is that all liens on the first title be disclosed and notated on the second.
See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 146.1(c).
177. The statistical estimate was made by Messrs. Walter Malcolm, Esq., and Robert
Haydock, Jr., Esq., in Memorandum, supra note 175.
178. See notes 142-44 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
180. For example, a few states refuse to retitle a vehicle already titled elsewhere even
though the vehicle is reregistered. See, e.g., Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (Supp.
1957). And a few states have held that liens cannot be perfected by local filing but a certifi-
cate of title must instead be procured. Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Vogt, 86 N.W.2d
771, 777 (Neb. 1957); C.I.T. Corp. v. W. J. Crosby & Co., 175 Va. 16, 7 S.E.2d 107
(1940). Should the Wyoming court enunciate a similar decision, carriers having their
principal place of business in Wyoming would be unable to secure the home state title
certificates necessary to perfect liens under S. 375.
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regular transit within the jurisdiction.' 8 ' Since in many multistate trucking
concerns certain vehicles are rarely operated in the carrier's home state, financ-
ing would still be curtailed. Should courts again compensate for S. 375 by
allowing recordation in the home state despite a vehicle's absence, out-of-state
creditors would be forced to check distant files to determine the existence of
outstanding encumbrances. And to the extent that protecting creditor reliance
on specific chattels is a goal of commercial law, eliminating the notice factor
of title certificates would be commercially retrogressive.
8 2
Another commercial objective-certainty-would also be subverted by the
bill. Whether the filing of liens on specific trucks constituted perfection in a
titling home state would often be resolved in other forums. Until every certi-
ficate of title jurisdiction decided these issues, the efficacy of many trans-
actions would remain problematical. Eventually, states might themselves en-
hance the utility of S. 375 by enacting complementary legislation. For ex-
ample, all titling states could deny certificates to vehicles of carriers principal-
ly conducting businesses in other jurisdictions yet, pursuant to interstate agree-
ment, continue registration.183 Cncomitantly, these states could certificate all
trucks belonging to companies primarily situated within their borders despite
lack of local registration. Nevertheless, federal legislation thus dependent on
statutory amendment in twenty-eight states at best rests on an insecure foun-
dation. 8 4 Apart from its failure to cope with title certificate laws, S. 375 would
grant national perfection to many security interests evidenced neither by filing
181. See, e.g., CAL VEHICLE CoDE § 143.5; see also WAHMANN, TRUCK COMPANY
FINANcING 76-77 (unpublished thesis 1946).
182. S. 375 may also pose constitutional questions. Clearly, a state statute providing
that perfection within the state is perfection everywhere cannot be extraterritorially en-
forced. See, e.g., Morris Plan Co. v. Jenkins, 216 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1.948) ;
Comment, Validity of Judgments Refusing Recognition to Chattel Mortgages Recorded
in Aiother State, 37 YALE L.J. 966 (1928). Consequently, by making compliance with the
home state's recording requirements nationally effective, S. 375 may involve a delegation
of power issue. If delegation were found, the bill might nevertheless be upheld on con-
venience, cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1958), or full faith and
credit grounds, see, generally, Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution, 45 CoLumT. L. Rav. 1 (1945). More likely, however, the constitutional
question would be avoided by a finding that the bill did not adopt prospective state regu-
lation but only that existing at the time of its enactment. See United States v. Paul, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 141 (1832). Congressional adoption of present, as opposed to future, state
laws is more properly classified as an incorporation by reference than a delegation. Resolu-
tion of the constitutional problem in this fashion, however, would only serve to heighten
the commercial undesirability of the bill. For as states changed their recording systems,
Congress would have to adopt the alterations before national perfection could be achieved
under the new procedure. Gaps would inevitably arise between state renovation and con-
gressional readoption. During these periods, of course, the status of truck liens would at
best be unclear.
183. See note 145 supra.
184. At present, there are twenty-one exclusive title, see note 138 supra, and seven
semi-exclusive title states, see note 139 supra.
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nor notation. Most truck financing occurs when vehicles are purchased.18 The
security device employed, the conditional sale, is deemed perfected in many
nonexclusive and nontitling jurisdictions absent recordation.'8 6 True, creditors
seldom examine files.' 87 But removing every opportunity to determine the
existence of nationally perfected liens seems a commercially dangerous solu-
tion.1
88
A revision of S. 375, introduced by truckers to safeguard the title certificate
system, contains similar defects.' 89 The key section of the revision provides
that, once a motor vehicle lien is noted on a title certificate, nationwide per-
fection of the security interest is governed by the laws of the issuing jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, liens on noncertificated vehicles are considered na-
185. REGULAR COMMON CARRIER CONFERENCE OF THE AMERIcAN TRUCKING AssOCIA-
TIoNs, INc., FINANCING THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY 40 (1952). See also TAFF, COMi-
MERCTAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 98-102 (rev. ed. 1955) ; WAHMANN, TRUCE COMPANY
FINANCING 67 (unpublished thesis 1946).
186. States not requiring filing of conditional sales contracts are: Arkansas, California,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Utah. Summary prepared from 1 & 2 CCH CONDIT.
SALE-CHAT. MORT. REP. (all states) f1 150.
In Florida and Mississippi, conditional sales contracts running longer than a specified
statutory term must be filed. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.09 (Supp. 1957) (two years) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 266 (1956) (three years). In Massachusetts, conditional sales will be record-
able when the Uniform Commercial Code comes into effect. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 106,
§§ 9-401, 9-403 (effective Oct. 1, 1958). Louisiana does not recognize locally initiated
conditional sales contracts. See Finance Security Co. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657 (La. Ct. App.
1939).
187. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
188. S. 375 may contain a latent Constance problem. See notes 160-65 supra and
accompanying text. The bill provides that liens "shall be valid and enforcible without filing
or recording in any State against any person to the same extent that such instrument would
be enforcible against such person if the filing and recording statutes of such state, if any,
applicable to such documents had been complied with . . . ." (Emphasis added.) In a
Constance jurisdiction, the recording laws can be "complied with" despite a gap after
execution. The effect of recordation is to perfect only against creditors whose claims arose
subsequent to perfection, not those obtaining claims during the gap. Thus, under S. 375,
filing in the home state within some safe time after execution may be deemed "compliance"
with the laws of a Constance jurisdiction, although the "to the same extent" language plus
the existence of a gap may cause invalidation in bankruptcy.
189. The relevant sections are:
"(b) If a motor vehicle subject to a security interest is covered by a certificate of title
issued under a statute of a jurisdiction which requires or permits indication on a cer-
tificate of title of such security interest in a motor vehicle, then the perfection of the
security interest is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate
and the security interest is perfected in all jurisdictions against all general creditors
and subsequent lien creditors of and all subsequent purchasers from the debtor carrier
if the security interest is indicated on the certificate.
"(c) In all cases not governed by subparagraph (b), the perfection of a security
interest is governed by the law of the home state and the security interest is perfected
1062 [Vol. 67:1024
MOBILE EQUIPMENT FINANCING
tionally perfected if recorded in the carrier's home jurisdiction, or when filing
is not there permitted, if perfected "under the law (including the conflict of
laws rules) of the home state."'190 The first provision would obviate the neces-
sity to acquire several titles, for perfection purposes, on each interstate truck.
Yet the problem of double titling for fraudulent objectives would be unre-
lieved.191 Mfore important, by necessitating recourse to the conflicts rule of a
carrier's home state, presumably le.r situs, the latter provision would often
occasion the very multistate perfection difficulties which the revision was de-
signed to remedy.1 2 Since the gentleman's agreement among states pertains
to registration as well as titling, interstate trucks are frequently registered in
nontitle jurisdictions. Should the home state of a carrier using such noncerti-
ficated vehicles not allow recordation, liens would be tested by the laws of any
state in which the trucks were operated. The likelihood that a need for per-
fection in every on-route jurisdiction would thus be restored is high.1 93 Con-
in all jurisdictions as to all general creditors and subsequent lien creditors of and
all subsequent purchasers from the debtor carrier if
"(1) there has been a public filing or recording of or with respect to the security
interest in the home state, or
"(2) the security interest has been perfected as to general creditors and subsequent
lien creditors under the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the home State.
"(d) Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the holder of a security interest from per-
fecting such interest in accordance with the laws of the several states and the District
of Columbia."
Permission to quote received in Letter from James F. Fort, Esq., Assistant to the General
Counsel, American Trucking Associations, Inc., to the Yale Law Journal, May 7, 1958,
on file in Yale Law Library.
190. Revision § (c) (2), note 189 supra.
191. Moreover, the revision, relying on interstate agreements under which trucks en-
gaged in multistate operations are titled in only one state, see note 145 supra and accom-
panying text, presumes the existence of a single title. But multiple titling, though not
prevalent, certainly exists. Letter from Homer Kripke, General Counsel for CIT Credit
Corp., to the Yale Law Journal, April 7, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. The possibility
of existing second titles is enhanced by the requirements of states such as Nebraska and
Virginia which make retitling prerequisite to lien perfection. See note 146 supra.
Moreover, some states do not adhere to reciprocity agreements but insist that all oper-
ating vehicles be registered. TAFF, op. cit. supra note 185, at 565-66. And trucks registered
in a state must be retitled there. See note 145 supra. See also State v. Teeslink, 177 Kan.
268, 278 P.2d 591 (1955) (lower court held sua sponte that the State Reciprocity Com-
mission had exceeded its constitutional authority in allowing foreign carriers to operate
in Kansas without reregistering and retitling; remanded for further hearing).
192. Revision § (c) (2), supra note 189.
193. The revision also raises the same constitutional doubts as S. 375. See note 182
supra. Moreover, neither S. 375 nor its revision adequately defines principal place of busi-
ness. Possible tests include: (1) greatest quantum of activities, (2) location of executive
offices, (3) principal terminal and (4) central accounting. The absence of a specific
standard would impair needed predictability as well as permit courts to upset commercial
reliance on the controlling effect of one jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Riverdale Productions,
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); cf. Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402 (1958). The
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ditional sales contracts, used to encumber a large percentage of trucks, cannot
be filed in many jurisdictions.19 4 And other security interests on out-of-state
vehicles may not be recordable in the carrier's home state.19
By far the greatest shortcoming of the revision is its last provision: "Noth-
ing in this Section shall prohibit the holder of a security interest from perfect-
ing such interest in accordance with the laws of the several states and the
District of Columbia."' 96 Carriers could, therefore, satisfy the revision by noting
title certificates, recording liens in their home states or filing in any jurisdic-
tion in which vehicles are located. 19 7 As a result, neither lenders nor third
parties could safely rely on title certificates or home state files. Unless will-
ing or able to examine the records and titles of every on-route jurisdiction,
financers would either have to depend on borrowers' warranties of clear title
or refrain from financing-alternatives representing no progress from the exist-
ing commercial quagmire.
Unavoidable weaknesses in both S. 375 and its revision demonstrate the
need for a centralized perfection system. The ultimate objectives to be achieved
in the field of truck financing are simply stated. For interstate carriers and
institutional lenders, the near impossible task of perfecting liens in many states
should be remedied, the cost decreased. For unsecured creditors as well as
subsequent financers, some method should be established which permits con-
venient determination of outstanding liens. Absent complete reciprocity among
states, certificate of title laws cannot fully accommodate interstate transactions.
Retitling, sometimes essential for perfection purposes, proves costly to carrier
and financer or allows the procuring of a fraudulent second title which jeop-
ardizes all classes of creditors. Significantly, incorporation of state law by
federal statute not only fails to cure the defects of the title certificate system
but heightens the undesirability of outmoded filing doctrines. Some combina-
principal place of business test employed by the Uniform Commercial Code was attacked
on grounds of vagueness, NEw YORr LAW REVISION COMMI SSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE NINE 92-93 (1955), though the Code draftsmen defended its
use, UNIFORM COMMER cIAL CODE, FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ENLARGED EDITO-
RIAL BOARD FOR AMENDMENTS OF TEXT AND ANswERs To CERTAIN CRITICISMS 179 (1955).
In doubtful cases, liens could be filed in all possible "home states," but not without restor-
ing double filing and double titling problems. Even if principal place of business were
adequately defined, neither S. 375 nor the revision provides for relocation contingencies.
Liens perfected in the home state would presumably be invalid after a carrier moved un-
less refiling and/or retitling were immediately effected.
Both S. 375 and the revision are inapplicable to liens on the interstate trucks of non-
carrier owners. Approximately 40% of the interstate fleet is comprised of leased equip-
ment. Hearings, supra note 12, at 29. Since many lessors are simply rental agencies, not
carriers, their financing problems would be unrelieved by either bill.
194. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
1.95. Lack of "permanent" situs would preclude recordation jurisdiction. See notes 127,
181 supra and accompanying text.
196. Revision § (d), supra note 189.
197. See notes 121-22, 137-40 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of troublesome factors-retitling,198 double financing, 199 removal refil-
ing 2 20 and perfection of liens filed in only one state or entirely unrecorded 
2 01
-must, of necessity, obtain under such legislation. Conversely, the ultimate
values of title certification could be realized, and the flaws eliminated, if the
responsibility were federally assumed. Indeed, a federal recording and title
certification bureau could resolve the problems confronting ship, aircraft and
railroad equipment financing as well as those which plague the trucking in-
dustry.
FEDERAL RECORDING BUREAU
Experience derived from years of state experimentation with perfection
methods indicates the functions of the proposed agency. Security instruments
should be filed so that interested parties may discover their terms.2°2 Also,
federal certificates of title should be issued to permit easy ascertainment of
ownership and lien existence.20 3 Encumbrances both recorded with the bureau
and noted on title certificates should be considered perfected throughout the
198. See notes 177-80 supra and accompanying text.
199. See note 176 supra and accompanying and following text.
200. See notes 192-95 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
202. Filing should not be required for possessory liens. As most courts recognize,
possession itself is sufficient notice of third party interests. See Petition of Chattanooga
Say. Bank, 261 Fed. 116 (6th Cir. 1919) (pledge); Marrs v. Barbeau, 146 N.E.2d 353
(Mass. 1957) (attachment). A specific exception is suggested to avoid results of cases like
In re Boston, 84 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1949), where the court, narrowly interpreting
the Texas Certificate of Title Act, held that recordation of a mechanics lien by a repair-
man in possession of the chattel was necessary.
203. Federal titling will facilitate determination of interests for parties geographically
distant from the central bureau. A titling system is already in effect for both ships, REv.
STAT. §§ 4159-61 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 29-31 (1.952) (vessel certificate of
enrollment), and airplanes, 52 STAT. 1005 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 521 (1952)
(aircraft certificate of registration). Documentary lien indorsement is required by the Ship
Mortgage Act, 41 STAT. 1000-01 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (1), (a) (2), (d) (1952),
and is authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 523(g) (1952), though the CAA has declined to perform this function, 14 C.F.R.
§ 501 n.1 (Supp. 1957). Titling may be unnecessary for railroad cars since, in effect, they
carry their own titles, all being plainly marked with the owners name. Moreover, railroad
rolling stock transactions are relatively few in number and substantial in amount so that
the risk of bona fide purchasers or creditors being misled is negligible. The jurisdictional
extension will involve only federal pre-emption of motor truck titling. The proposal is in
line with current ICC policy favoring federal titling of all motor vehicles. See statement
of the Hon. Owen Clarke, Chairman of the ICC, Hearings, supra note 12, at 29. All non-
possessory liens should be eligible for perfection on the federal title certificate. Purchase
money and nonpurchase money security interests should not be differentiated as was done
under the Missouri and Wyoming title statutes. See note 140 suprd. Junior liens should
also be perfectable, in contrast to New Jersey law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-11 (Supp.
1957), which permits only first liens to be noted. See National City Bank v. Del Sordo,
16 N.J. 530, 109 A.2d 631 (1954). If the title is to be relied on by third parties in lieu of
a record search, it must reveal all outstanding obligations.
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country.20 4 Double titling would thus be precluded,20 5 perfection immeasurably
simplified and notice made readily available.20 6 To date, other recommenda-
tions for federal perfection have presupposed management by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. That performing perfection functions for millions of
vehicles would unduly burden this agency is documented by ICC opposition
to such plans. 20 7 On the other hand, the creation of a new filing administration
204. A federal certificate of title system would, of course, entail the maintenance of
title as well as security interest records. Leaving the function of recording title transfers
to the states would force purchasers of secondhand trucks to examine both state and fed-
eral files. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 19, 29. A federal act can easily be adapted
from the recently promulgated Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft
Act, 9B UNIFolm LAWS ANN. 239-73 (1957), which includes all necessary provisions.
205. See text following note 173 supra. Under the state system, no coordinated super-
vision over title issuance exists. Consequently, dishonest debtors can and do obtain fraudu-
lent second titles. See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Autonobiles,
96 U. PA. L. REV. 455 (1948). But under a federal system, unitary control could easily
prevent issuance of second titles. Moreover, federal titling would facilitate curbing the
"duplicate title" racket. Many states presently issue "clear" duplicates when the applicant
avers that the "lost" title showed no liens. Leary, supra at 476. Administrative procedures
whereby duplicate titles are distinctively marked as such with a warning that the vehicle
may be subject to undisclosed liens should effectively curb this swindle. See U~nFoPZI
MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT Ac- § 13 (a).
206. State objections to federal pre-emption of the titling function may be forthcoming.
Some state highway taxes are geared to title issuance. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art.
66Y2, § 29 (1957) (tax equal to 2% of fair market value imposed on all vehicles engaged
in interstate commerce as prerequisite to certification). Since motor vehicle registration
laws are not pre-empted by the proposed federal statute, taxes presently imposed upon
title issuance could be levied instead when a vehicle is registered. Secondly, states obtain
revenues from issuing title certificates and recording security instruments. However, these
amounts are relatively minor in the state budget and are used mainly to defray clerical
costs. See note 143 szpra. Since the clerical function is to be eliminated, only a slight real
revenue loss, if any, will occur. Nontitle states may have to make a more substantial ad-
justment. Their recording fees are much higher, sometimes $1 for every $100 face value
of the instrument recorded. Hearings, supra note 12, at 49. To the extent recording fees
are actually revenue measures, loss will have to be recompensed by a highway tax. Public
interest in improving trucking facilities should override any inconvenience attending minor
shifts in state taxing structures.
Present confusion derives from diversities among state systems. See Richter, A Uni-
forn Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law--A New Attempt, Bus. Law., July 1953, p. 6.
That states are not prepared to remedy the situation is evidenced by the history of the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Law, 9B UNIFORm LAWS
ANN. 239-73. The Commissioners urged adoption of the act to preclude threatened federal
legislation. Prefatory Note, id. at 235. Yet only one state, Connecticut, has enacted the
uniform statute. Ibid. Its rejection in other jurisdictions is noted in Report of the Sub-
committee on Commercial Laws, Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, 11 Bus. LAW. 4
(1956).
207. Hearings, supra note 12, at 1.9-20, 30, 55. At present, 586,000 vehicles regularly
operate in interstate commerce. Id. at 29. This figure is computed by including tractor-
trailer units as one vehicle. Since liens are often obtained separately against each unit, a
more relevant count would be over 1,000,000 vehicles. Ibid. Of the 9,000,000 more com-
mercial trucks and busses which do not qualify as interstate common or contract carriers,
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would not only meet this objection but, by relieving the existing perfection
duties of the ICC, CAA and Customs Bureau, curb needless duplication of
administrative expense. 208 Costs now incurred by 126 federal offices for sepa-
rately recording aircraft, railroad and ship encumbrances could be minimized
through operation of a central bureau. 20 9 Moreover, a consolidated system
would expedite blanket financing for companies which operate integrated ship,
airline, railroad or trucking facilities as well as make credit investigation more
convenient.
ibid, presumably many engage in some interstate operations, thus substantially increasing
the total to be governed by a federal agency.
An independent bureau could also assume future governmental recordation functions
which would otherwise have to be channeled to existing administrative bodies. For ex-
ample, see Note, 67 YALE L.J. 504, 513 n.42 (1958), proposing federal recording for live-
stock chattel mortgages. See also Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Comnercial Aircraft
Equipment Financing, 13 Bus. LAW. 199, 204 (1958), urging federal recording for liens
on all aircraft fixed property.
Locating the bureau in Washington may not be necessary. Since the District of Colum-
bia area is becoming congested, a geographically central location, such as Kansas City or
Chicago, might be preferable. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 55-56.
208. The introduction of modernized recording techniques would both simplify opera-
tions and further reduce costs. For example, machines have been developed which can read
documents. Van Deusen, The Coming Victory Over Paper, Fortune, Oct. 1955, pp. 130,
199. Avoiding the necessity for transferring documentary material to punch cards, this
innovation in automatic clerical machines should soon be out of the experimental stage
and ready for use in an operation such as the one proposed. See also Time, March 17,
1958, p. 61, Another workable device to reduce record storage and handling costs is micro-
filming. See, generally, DE SOl.A, MICROFILMING CC. 1, 3 (1944). The cost is negligible.
One firm estimates that 4000 8Y2" x 11" documents can be microfilmed for $4.15 including
processing and handling. Letter from Recordak Corp. to the Yale Law Journal, Jan. 16,
1958, on file in Yale Law Library. In fact, microfilming has already been put to use in at
least one state recording system. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 318.09 (1958).
209. In addition to one office operated by the CAA and one by the ICC, 124 filing
divisions are maintained in U.S. "home ports" for recordation of ship mortgages. See notes
35-36 supra and accompanying text. The total number of home ports is obtained from 19
C.F.R. § 1.1 at 6-12 (Supp. 1957), which lists all United States ports. An asterisk before
the name of any port indicates that it may issue marine documents. Id. at 5 n.3. Only ports
of documentation can be home ports. Letter from the Bureau of Customs to the Yale Law
Journal, Feb. 26, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. A count of the asterisked ports totals
119 plus 5 ports added by 19 C.F.R. § 1.1 at 5 n.5 (Supp. 1957), or 124 in all.
Elimination of home port recordation will necessitate repealing 41 STAT. 1002-03 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §§ 925-27 (1952). For a summary of all changes to be made in the present
Mortgage Act, see note 217 infra. The only function properly left to the Collector of
Customs would be documentary indorsement. Since vessels cannot be cleared for sailing
unless documents are on board ship, customs office indorsement avoids the delay inherent
in forwarding papers to a central office. Moreover, each Collector should indorse docu-
ments only for home port vessels. The existing system, 41 STAT. 1001 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§ 922(d) (1952), requiring indorsement to be made in any port upon telegraphed or
mailed instructions from the home port's Customs Collector, and refusing clearance until
all formalities are completed, should be abandoned. Instead, preferred status should be
granted until the vessel returns to its home port, to avoid both clearance delays and in-
creased possibility of error inherent in existing law.
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With the establishment of a new federal bureau, perfection law should be
modernized to reflect contemporary goals. Primarily, meaningless formalities
now contained in most state and federal recording statutes should be abolished.
Recordation serves principally to provide notice of lien existence to interested
third parties and to prevent fraudulent backdating of security transfers. 210
Good faith affidavits, notary public seals, acknowledgments and similar pre-
requisites are unrelated to either function.2 1 1 More generally, a commercial
good faith standard of reasonableness should underlie all requirements. Instru-
ments promptly sent to the bureau" for recordation should be deemed perfected
as of the date of their execution. 212 In comparable fashion, temporary filing
without registration certificate indorsement should be allowed during a ship's
voyage, to remain effective for a reasonable time after the encumbered vessel's
return to its home port. 213 The judicial rule invalidating defective filing should
also be replaced by the reasonableness standard so that errors which are not
seriously misleading will not preclude lien perfection. 214 When, through gov-
ernment fault, instruments are misfiled or liens not noted on title certificates,
the secured lender should be fully protected. Other parties detrimentally rely-
ing on erroneous files or title certificate notation may be compensated out of
risk distribution funds derived from recordation fees.215 Finally, renewal refil-
210. See Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy
Act, 43 CoLum. L. Ray. 58, 70 (1943) ; authorities cited note 174 supra. See also Howard
v. McPhail, 37 R.I. 21, 24, 91 Atl. 12, 14 (1914). But see Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 402,
432 n.105 (1958).
211. See notes 149-52 supra and accompanying text.
212. When a good faith filing is rejected and refiled within a reasonable time, pro-
tection should also commence from the date of original execution. This provision will
avoid such problems as the one raised by Kerley Chemical Corp. v. Colboch, 145 Cal. App.
2d 509, 302 P.2d 621 (1956), discussed in text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
213. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
214. This approach is adopted by the UNFORm COMMERciAL CODE § 9-402(5) (1957
draft). Moreover, serious partial errors should result only in partial invalidation.
215. Reimbursement should be limited to the loss suffered from actual reliance. If the
secured party causes the error, the risk distribution fund should not be available. Instead,
all creditors detrimentally relying on files should have a superior claim against the col-
lateral. Here, too, parties not checking records before extending credit should not benefit
from the mistake. Only where detrimental reliance is proven would the unsecured cred-
itor's rights become superior to those of the secured lender. Mistakes should seldom occur
if modernized recording techniques are employed. See note 208 supra. Potential govern-
ment error can be further reduced by not imposing record search responsibilities on the
bureau. Both the CAA and ICC have adopted this practice. The ICC so provides by regu-
lation. 49 C.F.R. § 57.5(d) (Supp. 1957). The CAA follows the same procedure although
no specific regulation to that effect has been promulgated. See Hearings, supra note 12,
at 30. Both agencies keep their files properly indexed and open to public inspection, a cus-
tom which should be continued under the proposed system. In the few cases in which in-
formation cannot be obtained from an equipment document, or geographical distance pre-
vents a personal record search, actual notice would probably be obtainable from a private
agency. Fees should be relatively nominal, especially when present cost of state or customs
office file checking is considered.
At present, litigation is required to determine whether the creditor or third party bears
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ing should be required to prevent the accumulation of outdated records, though,
contrary to most acts,21 0 a filed instrument should remain valid for the term
of the loan it evidences.2 17
the initial loss. Theoretically, the loser may then sue the state but rarely does so because
of judicial reluctance to impose liability. See, e.g., Boscho, Inc. v. Knowles, 147 Me. 8, 83
A.2d 122 (1951) ; Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 44 N.W.2d 501. (1950).
The Ship Mortgage Act has a section -permitting suit against the Collector of Customs for
misfeasance in recording or indorsing documents. 41 STAT. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 941 (c)
(1952). Yet to date, the section has never been tested. GILMORE & BLACK 588-89. Instead
of wasteful litigation, equitable distribution of risk seems more appropriate. Although the
bureau's negligence would cause the loss, financial responsibility seems better placed on
the carriers than the taxpayers.
Various systems presently in effect are directly analogous. Notably, the Torrens system
of land registration creates a fund for the benefit of non-negligent claimants. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 508.76 (Supp. 1957). For general discussion, see Cushman, Torrens
Titles and Title Insurance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 589, 600-02 (1937). Under the French
droit administratif, government failure to record a lien apparently constitutes a faute de
service for which the citizen is entitled to compensation by the state. See Berth6lemy,
The 'Conseil D'Etat" it France, 12 J. CoMp. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 23, 30-32 (1.930).
216. See, e.g., UNIFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-403(2) (1957 draft) (five years);
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 11 (three years); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-303
(Supp. 1957) (two years). See also note 153 supra.
217. The statute should provide that the bureau retain the instrument for its stated
term and for a specified time thereafter, to be destroyed absent timely request for renewal.
Refiling within this period would revalidate the instrument for any requested term.
In sum, the proposed law would have the following effect on present statutes. It would
repeal the Ship Mortgage Act's recordation provisions, 41 "STAT. 1000-03 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 922-23, 925-27 (1952), the Civil Aeronautics Act lien recordation section, 52 STAT. 1006
(1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523 (1952), and the Interstate Commerce Act's railroad
equipment lien perfection provision, 66 STAT. 724, 49 U.S.C. § 20c (1952). However, only
the following sections should not be re-embodied in the proposed act:
Ship Mortgage Act § 922(a) (3) (good faith affidavit provision), for reasons stated
in note 43 supra.
Ship Mortgage Act § 922(a) (4) (waiver of preferred standing provision), for reasons
stated at notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
Ship Mortgage Act § 922(d) (interport indorsement provision), for reasons stated
in note 209 supra.
Ship Mortgage Act § 922(e) (mixed vessel-nonvessel security separate discharge
provision), for reasons stated at notes 51-58 supra and accompanying text.
Ship Mortgage Act § 925(a), which provides for recording notice of an existing
maritime lien. This section, not affecting lien status or rank, GILMtORE & BLACK 616,
would be superfluous under the proposed system.
Ship Mortgage Act § 925(b) (certificate of mortgage discharge filed with Collector
of Customs), which would be obsolete if the home port recordation system were
abolished.
Ship Mortgage Act § 926(b) (acknowledgment provision), for reasons stated in text
at notes 210-11 supra.
Ship Mortgage Act § 926(c) (refiling after change of home port), which would be
obsolete if the home port recordation system were abolished.
Ship Mortgage Act § 927 (Collector of Customs to keep records open for inspection
and furnish certificates of recorded mortgages). The proposed federal bureau would
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A comprehensive statutory scheme must embrace some equipment generally
or permanently located within one state.218 Since an inter-intra state use di-
chotomy would raise difficult problems of classification, all trucks should be
made subject to the proposed statute. Moreover, the ease of converting an
intrastate vehicle to interstate operation without the financer's consent would
render any initial categorization commercially unreliable. The very equipment
mobility which would occasion such problems suggests the constitutionality of
the proposal. Similarly, inclusion of encumbrances on railroad fixed property
should not raise constitutional doubts. Both intrastate trucks and railroad
realty necessarily affect the flow of interstate commerce. 219 Decisions uphold-
ing federal jurisdiction over intrastate air and ship security transactions would
seem to allow such extended coverage. 220 An additional constitutional base
allow free access to its records, note 215 supra, but should not issue such certificates
to reduce possibility of governmental error, ibid.
Civil Aeronautics Act § 503(e) (acknowledgment provision), for reasons stated in
text at notes 210-11 supra.
The Interstate Commerce Act § 20c also has an acknowledgment clause which should be
eliminated. And Civil Aeronautics Act § 503 (h), pertaining to the issuance and renewal of
airworthiness certificates, is obviously unrelated to the proposed statute.
218. Equipment owned by the United States government, not within the scope of
present recordation statutes, would also be excluded from the proposed act. The Ship
Mortgage Act covers only vessels of the United States, by definition not governmentally
owned. REv. STAT. §§ 4131-32 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 11, 221 (1952). Section
503 (a) (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act is limited to privately owned (civil) aircraft as
defined by 44 STAT. 573 (1926), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 179(e) (1952). Recording pro-
visions of the Interstate Commerce Act do not involve the government since it neither
owns nor operates railroads. Liens on equipment in the possession of dealers should also
be excepted from the proposed statute. Dealer financing is usually effected through trust
receipt transactions, Gilmore, Chattel Security: 11, 57 YAsLE L.J. 761, 765 (1948), which
are adequately governed by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, presently in force in thirty-
one states, 9C UNIFORm LAws ANN. 220 (1957). Moreover, the problem of regular inter-
state movement, with concomitant recordation difficulties, does not exist while inventory
remains on a dealer's premises.
219. The commerce power, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, expanded by the Supreme
Court to include many areas originally under state regulation, should suffice as a constitu-
tional foundation. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944) (insurance); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (labor standards);
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (agriculture). See also Comment, 45 Mica. L.
REV. 1021 (1947). Directly in point are the doctrines of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (federal regulation of home-grown wheat for personal consumption sustained be-
cause of effect on interstate commerce), and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1871.) (federal regulation of intrastate vessel upheld since goods carried part of the stream
of commerce). See also Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932, 935 (10th Cir. 1942),
wherein the court stated: "It cannot be doubted that if the Federal Act is devoted to the
promotion of safety and efficiency in interstate commerce, whether it be the stagecoach,
sailboat, steamship, railroad train, motor truck, or airplane, if the Act bears some reason-
able and rational relationship to the subject over which it has assumed to act, the power is
supreme and may not be denied, although it may include within its scope activities which
are intrastate in character."
220. The constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42-52 (1934). Section 503 of
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may be found in the federal bankruptcy power.22 ' Although historically limited
to regulating insolvencies, the power over "the subject of bankruptcies" was
intended to protect the national credit structure as well.222 Thus derived from
the Civil Aeronautics Act, not yet tested by the Supreme Court, was upheld in Blalock v.
Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949) (leading case) ; In re Veterans' Air Ex-
press Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948). Contra, Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner, 174
Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1940), which declared in dictum that the act was
unconstitutional if applied to planes engaged exclusively in intrastate commerce. Both the
Blalock and Veterans' Air Express cases cite and reject this view. For discussion, see
Mickelson, Aircraft Lien Law and Procedure, 44 ILL. B.J. 863, 864-67 (1.956). Moreover,
broad congressional powers over the airways established by long standing legislation and
a series of Supreme Court decisions presumes validation when a decisive test arises. 44
STAT. 572 (1926), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1952) ; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. State
Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954) ; Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946). Counsel for institutional lenders universally accept the statute as valid. Adkins
& Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing, 13 Bus. LAW.
199, 203 (1958).
While limited to equipment "used or intended for use in interstate commerce," the
railroad rolling stock recordation act covers virtually every railroad car in the nation. For
rolling stock belonging to the few intrastate rail carriers is constantly shifted to interstate
trains and, consequently, falls within the statutory compass. See LoCKLItr, ECONOnCS OF
TRANSPORTATION 609, 614-15 (3d ed. 1947) ; Adkins & Billyou, Current Developments
in Railroad Equipment Financing, 12 Bus. LAW. 207, 214 (1957). Were the proposed
statute not so limited, its constitutionality would still seem assured. Cf. Seaboard Air Line
R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234
U.S. 342 (1914).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
222. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 0.02, at 5 (14th ed. 1956). See also ibid.: "Con-
gress was to have an all-inclusive power through the bankruptcy grant to enact any legis-
lation reasonably framted and related to the subject of bankruptcies, which in turn is in-
dissolubly linked to commerce and credit." Cf. LOVELAND, BANKRUPTCY 20 (4th ed. 1912).
What little is known of the founding fathers' intentions supports this view. In the only
recorded statement, James Madison observed: "The power of establishing uniform laws
of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will pre-
vent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into dif-
ferent states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." THE
FFDERALISt No. 42, at 336 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Madison). See United States v. Pusey,
27 Fed. Cas. No. 16098, at 632 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872) ("The 'subject of bankruptcy' in
a general sense, concerns the relation of debtor and creditor ... .") ; In re Klein, 14 Fed.
Cas. No. 7865, at 718 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) ("[I]t [the bankruptcy power] extends to all cases
where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors;
this is its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And
all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending to further the great
end of the subject-distribution and discharge-are in the competency and discretion of
congress"). See also In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, No. 11673 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) ; S. Doc.
No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1932). For a summary of the bankruptcy power's develop-
ment during the nineteenth century, see Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181.
(1902).
Federal bankruptcy statutes have almost always been sustained. See WARREN, BANK-
RuPTcY iN UNiTEm STATES HIsTORY 9 (1935) (at publication date, only one bankruptcy-
grounded statute had been invalidated). However, the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act,
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either a bankruptcy or commerce foundation, federal power over ship, rail,
air and truck carriers should be deemed as broad as the economic needs of
these intrinsically interstate industries.
Act of May 24, 1934, c. 345, 48 STAT. 798, was avoided shortly thereafter in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), over the strong
dissent of four Justices. Writing for the minority, Mr. Justice Cardozo pointed out that the
bankruptcy clause is a constantly expanding power; that every effort to widen it has met
with bitter opposition, yet has eventually been approved. Id. at 536. The Cardozian philos-
ophy prevailed. The Municipal Debt Readjustment Act was redrafted, re-enacted, 50 STAT.
653 (1937), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 401-04 (1952), and upheld, United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
See also remarks of Henry Clay, reprinted in WmuxEN, op. cit. supra at 159, to the
effect that the philosophy underlying the bankruptcy power is the nation's right fully to
utilize its citizens' unimpaired facilities as producers and consumers. Clearly, this goal is
not being attained for the trucking industry.
Apart from its effect on credit structures generally, secured commercial financing and
lien recordation is directly linked to bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (1931) ; Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954) ; in re Boston, 84
F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1949).
Utilizing the bankruptcy power was suggested by one of the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code in connection with possible federal adoption of that act. Braucher,
Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 100, 105
(1951).
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